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CLASS, PERSONALITY, CONTRACT, AND
UNCONSCIONABILITY
JEFFREY L. HARRISON*
As soon as you're born they make you feel small
By giving you no time instead of it all
Till the pare is so big you feel nothing at all
A working class hero is something to be.1
I. INTRODUCTION
My thesis begins with the idea of "entitlement"-not a legal en-
titlement, but a "sense of entitlement."2 That is, a sense of deserv-
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. I have dispensed with the long list of names
that often appears at the beginning of an article. Where discussions with specific individials
have helped me develop certain ideas, I have indicated this in the footnotes. I would like,
however, to thank Sarah Wilson and Joanna Lippman for their editorial help, and Richard
Markovits for a number of useful comments.
1. JOHN LENNON, Working Class Hero, on PLASTIC ONO BAND (Apple Records, Ltd. 1970)
2. I do not mean to imply that everyone will have difficulty understanding what I mean
by a "sense of entitlement." But much of what I say in the following pages is devoted to the
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Ing something. For most of us, it is important to feel that we have
received that to which we are entitled. In the context of an ex-
change, it means that we want to feel we have been treated fairly
or reached a state of "compensatory justice."3 Part of my thesis is
that this sense of entitlement is not evenly distributed among us.
As an example, suppose that two individuals are hired as entry-
level law professors. Before moving to their new locations, both in-
quire about their employer's willingness to pay moving expenses.
The response to each is, "It is our policy to pay up to $3,000." One
professor responds, "But that is not enough! I cannot possibly
move my family for that amount." An argument ensues. The sec-
ond professor simply processes this information and uses it in ar-
ranging her move.4
The difference in the responses reflects a difference in their ex-
pectations and their senses of entitlement. This difference may be
explained by something quite concrete. For example, the first pro-
fessor may have seen a memorandum indicating that the school
traditionally had paid moving expenses for new members of the
faculty But one's sense of entitlement may also, and generally
does, arise from less direct and more subtle influences. As a child
the first professor may have heard repeatedly how smart, clever or
attractive he was and, thus, began to feel as though he was some-
how more worthy than others. Or, he may have attended a prestigi-
ous school where he was "taught" that graduates of that school are
idea that not only do we each have a sense of entitlement, but that that sense is a function
of factors that are unrelated to whether one really is "entitled" or "deserving." This broader
statement may be difficult for some to comprehend. My sense is that the stronger one's
sense of entitlement, the more they will have invested m believing that they are "truly"
entitled. Thus, I suggest that the reader who finds what follows to be unacceptable, should
ask him or herself whether they are motivated by something other than whatever errors or
overstatements follow. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY. A STUDY
IN ETHICS AND POLICS 117 (1932) ("The most common form of hypocrisy among the pnvi-
leged classes is to assume that their privileges are the just payments with which society
rewards specially useful or meritorious functions."). I would like to thank Amy Mashburn
for bringing Niebuhr's views on this matter to my attention.
3. By "compensatory justice" I am referring to the fairness of the exchange between indi-
viduals. See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Con-
tract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REv. 769, 780 (1985) (defining "compen-
satory justice" as the reward of "just deserts" resulting from the conference of a benefit
upon another).
4. In this example, gender specification is intentional.
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somehow special.5 In contrast, the second faculty member may
have been treated quite differently, that is, never taught that she is
somehow special and more deserving.
This sense of entitlement is the cornerstone of this Article, but
there are two more components. The first is that social class0 is an
important determinant of one's sense of entitlement. The second
component is that individuals with a higher general sense of enti-
tlement require more of whatever is at stake in an exchange, in
order to achieve a state that they regard as compensatorily just,
than those with a lower sense of entitlement. Together, these pro-
positions produce the general thesis that social class and the re-
sulting sense of entitlement have an impact on the terms of private
orderings. Because individuals from higher social classes have a
greater sense of entitlement, the terms of exchanges between dif-
ferent classes typically will favor those individuals. More generally,
this means that the private orderings of people who belong to a
class-oriented society will passively, though relentlessly, reinforce
the existing class structure.7 In essence, the source of the continual
5. Interestingly, sometimes a sense of entitlement can be purchased.
6. I make no attempt here to define social class m a precise way that will satisfy every
critic of what is to follow. To me it involves weighing education, job status, income, and
wealth. Harold Hodges suggests that classes are "the blended product of shared and analo-
gous occupational orientations, educational backgrounds, economic wherewithal, and like
experiences." HAROLD M. HODGES, JR., SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS IN AMERICA 13 (1984). I
believe this is generally consistent with the measures used in PAUL FUSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE
THROUGH THE AMERICAN CLASS SYSTEM (1983). In the first chapter of his book, Fussell offers
interesting insights into how touchy discussions of class can be. I am indebted to my friend
Walter Weyrauch for helping me understand the significance and signifiers of class.
7. Of course, for this to work smoothly, both classes must accept the legitimacy of their
positions. See PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 143-67 (1986) (distin-
guishing the various expectations of individuals and their relation to contemporary values
and social standards); JON ELSTER, SouR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONAL-
rry 145 (1983) (explaining the necessity for oppressed and exploited classes to believe and
accept the very social order that accepts them); L. Richard Della Fave, The Meek Shall Not
Inherit the Earth: Self-Evaluation and the Legitimacy of Stratification, 45 Am. Soc. REV.
955 (1980) (identifying the diverse collection of social mechanisms that generate, maintain
and legitimize the notion of unequal distribution of resources); Robert Gordon, New Devel-
opments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLrrmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRrrIQUE 281, 286-87
(David Kairys ed., 1982) (citing to Antonio Gramsci's theory of "hegemany" which suggests
that class domination is most effective when both the dominant and dominated classes be-
lieve that there are no viable alternatives to the existing order).
An article that seems driven by the same concerns I have, but which takes a different
perspective is Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
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societal imbalances that flow from "freedom of contract" are
largely the results of the damage that class stratification has al-
ready inflicted.'
I want to state this in terms that are slightly different but that
may be more familiar. The idea that people act in accordance with
their senses of compensatory justice means, in effect, that they
have a generalized preference for sensing that they have received
fair treatment.' When they find the terms of an exchange accept-
able, this is an expression that this preference is satisfied. Much of
my point is that this preference, or what it takes to satisfy it, is
"taught" in large measure by one's social position and the laws
that help preserve the social structure. In the terms economists
use, this preference is determined endogenously-that is, it is not
exogenous or simply a given.10
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc. REv. 95 (1974) (analyzing how the legal system oper-
ates by looking at the different kinds of parties involved and how their differences affect the
rules and institutional facilities as opposed to looking at how the rules and facilities impact
the parties).
8. A baseline source on this is RICHARD SENNETT & JONATHAN COBB, THE HIDDEN INJU-
RIES OF CLASS (1973).
9. An obvious implication of equating this with a preference is to suggest that this sense
of being treated fairly is just one of many sources of utility. I and many others do not
believe, however, that all things that motivate us can be reduced to a single plane or class of
utility. See, e.g., AMITAI ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 67-92
(1988) (suggesting that personal behavior is influenced by a vast array of pressures and
obligations rather than the need to fulfill moral commitments instead of pleasure); MARK A.
LUTZ & KENNETH Lux, THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISTIC ECONOMICS 9-22 (1979) (discussing
the hierarchy of human needs, ranging from the basics, including food and shelter, to the
less tangible, truth and justice); Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Choice, Expectations and
Measurability, 68 Q.J. EcON. 503, 515 (1954) (summarizing the "Principle of the Irreducibil-
ity of Wants," which holds that the motives and feelings of individuals are so disproportion-
ate in power and authority that human wants can not be reduced to a common basis); Jef-
frey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and
Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1328-34 (1986) (explaining the idea of "lexical ordering,"
which states that those values that are afforded priority are not interchangeable with
others); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Eco-
nomcs Theory, 6 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 317 (1977) (examining the problems that have arisen
from the traditional economic assumption that individuals are motivated only by self-
interest).
10. For a good discussion of the difficulties in dropping the assumption that tastes and
preferences are a given and an example of the interesting work to which dropping that as-
sumption can lead to, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DuE L.J. 1, 14-22. See also Mark Kelman, Con-
sumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669, 677, 695 (1979) (comparing the Coase Theorem's desire to defend the concept of
[Vol. 35:445
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An important implication of this thesis is that Pareto superior-
ity 11 may be an especially poor moral basis for enforcing interclass
contracts. This follows from the likelihood that whether an ex-
change will leave both parties feeling better off is contingent on
disparities in class, self-esteem, or personal sense of entitlement. If
the disparities were less, the terms-distributive consequences-of
some contracts would vary and other contracts may not exist at all.
Just as contracts that are the result of coercion are not enforced
because one's consent is induced artificially, contracts that come
about because of our class-contingent notions of what we "deserve"
seem equally artificial. 2
The thrust of this argument is that "freedom" of contract is an
illusion, in that we are taught from birth, by the fortuity of our
class, that to which we should feel entitled. Furthermore, the con-
clusion that contract law principles are carefully designed to per-
mit and facilitate inequality in exchanges seems accurate. For ex-
ample, most questions in contract law are evaluated by objective
standards, but the actual exchange itself, perhaps the only thing
that really matters, is held to a subjective standard under the basic
"state neutrality" against the specious claim of taste-neutrality which is inevitably under-
mined by existing liability rules); Robert A. Pollak, Endogenous Tastes in Demand and
Welfare Analysis, 68 Am. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 374 (May 1978) (applying welfare
analysis and economic analysis to the study of taste formation and change); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129 (1986) (conclud-
ing that government action in the form of legal intervention is frequently justifiable regard-
less of the ancillary effects on private preferences).
For a typical example of the conventional approach in which law has no impact on prefer-
ences, see Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REv. 1053 (1977).
11. In this context Pareto superiority is achieved when two individuals can enter into an
exchange that makes them both feel better off while no one is made worse off than they
were prior to the exchange. See DAvW W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-12 (1992) (discussing the classification scheme devised by Vil-
fredo Pareto for making a neutral judgment as to wealth and utility maximization).
12. As the language in this sentence implies, there can be a number of ways in which an
exchange can improve the position of the exchanging parties. Part of the argument to be
developed later is that some exchanges that would tend to make both better off will not be
acceptable because they offend the sense of compensatory justice of one of the parties.
Although he does not address this issue specifically, I think that the view of coercion in
Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 wis. L. REv. 769, 792-95, can be interpreted in such
a way that the process of adaptation I am writing about ultimately can be seen as a response
to coercion.
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rule that the law will not address "adequacy of consideration. "13
Moreover, courts generally have avoided directly addressing ques-
tions of "substantive unconscionability," the one legal doctrine
that would directly penetrate the fairness of the exchange. 14 Yet, if
subjective notions of fairness are class-contingent, it makes sense
to employ an objective standard when examining the adequacy of
consideration in contract cases, possibly through expanded reliance
on substantive unconscionability 15
My argument is not that courts should apply the theory of un-
conscionability for the sole purpose of promoting equality A more
important point is that law can have an educative or "therapeu-
tic" 6 function and that routine reliance on substantive unconscio-
nability as a basis for not enforcing contracts can have the effect of
elevating the sense of entitlement of the disadvantaged and de-
creasing the sense of entitlement of the privileged. Howard Lesnick
captures the notion perfectly when he describes the possible libera-
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1979) ("If the requirement of Con-
sideration is met, there is no additional requirement of equivalence in the values ex-
changed ").
14. A 1986 study reports that "since 1971, no court has declared a contract unconsciona-
ble solely on substantive unconscionability grounds." Craig Horowitz, Comment, Reviving
the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940,
942 n.14 (1986). On the other hand, in 1982 Melvin Eisenberg identified 10 cases m which a
finding of unconscionability was based on price alone. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV. 741, 752 (1982); see also M.P Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 782-93 (1969) (discussing the case of invol-
untary bankruptcy); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 931, 952 (1969) (providing the example of price disparity and subsequent invoca-
tion of unconscionability theory).
Of course, courts respond to inequality in exchanges by using a variety of theories other
than unconscionability. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 255-344 (2d ed. 1990).
15. By this I mean some version of the "reasonable person" standard. See James Gordley,
Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1637 n.200 (1981).
16. The "therapeutic" effects of law in its various forms have been explored, primarily m
the context of mental health law. See DAviD B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991). It iS from Wexler and Winick's work that I too became
concerned with what might be termed "therapeutic effects," in the sense that I am inter-
ested in the healing potential of unconscionability. I am indebted to John Robertson who
advised me of their work.
[Vol. 35:445
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tion of the downtrodden so that they change from defendants to
potential "counter-claimant[s]. ' 17
In the pages that follow, I first explain in greater detail how
one's sense of compensatory justice can affect his or her view of an
exchange. Then, in Section III, I examine the two components of
my thesis and indicate how they are supported by social science
research in the areas of equity theory' s and relative deprivation
theory 19 In Section IV, I illustrate more formally the way in which
equity theory and relative deprivation theory undermine Pareto
superiority as a principled basis for the enforcement of contracts.
In Section V, I address concerns that greater judicial intervention
in private orderings would threaten personal autonomy, and review
the suspicions and reservations that already have been voiced in
the context of agreements resulting from efforts at informal dis-
pute resolution. The questions raised in that much narrower con-
text are based on concerns similar to those discussed in this Arti-
cle. Finally, I defend a proposal to expand the concept and use of
unconscionability The critical question in this context is whether
law as a preference-shaping variable can alter expectations and
17. Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective
on Perspectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 413, 437. I am indebted to Jack Boger for telling me about
this article.
18. See J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965); Elaine Walster et al., New Direc-
tions in Equity Research, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Leonard
Berkowitz & Elaine Walster eds., 1972).
19. See W.G. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 9-35 (1966) (introduc-
ing notions of "relative deprivation" and "reference groups" and how both are derived from
the truism that people's attitudes, aspirations and grievances largely depend on the frame of
relevance within which they are conceived). For further discussion of the importance of rela-
tive deprivation theory, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 815, 836-37 (1990) (distinguishing legal instruments employed for purposes of redis-
tribution from the economist's perspective of maximizing efficiency); Kenneth Karst, Why
Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 261-62 (1983) (referring to culturally inbred under-
standing in America that winners and losers are natural consequences of a fair competition
system); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 31-38 (1992) (examin-
ing the process of social comparison and its relation to the theory of relative deprivation);
Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Changes, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1773-76 (1991) (discussing the theory of relative deprivation in
connection with legal norms and gender hierarchies); Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its
.Due, 98 YALE L.J. 1135, 1149-50 (1989) (looking at the societal tendency to blame the vic-
tims of injustice and how inherently unequal social circumstances contribute to such a
practice).
1994]
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one's sense of entitlement in order to assist the disadvantaged to
"prefer" better treatment.
Underlying my thesis are two, primarily implicit, subthemes.
The first subtheme is the recognition of the false separation of
microeconomic from macroeconomic issues. Concepts like social
class and income distribution seem to fit into macroeconomic cate-
gories, but invariably they are the results of innumerable smaller
transactions. Thus, income distribution cannot be divorced from
basic wage determination. Accumulations of wealth or debt are
simply the results of series of smaller individual transactions. In-
deed, much of the overall thesis of this Article depends on the in-
terdependence between individual transactions and broad-based
measures of social class.
The second subtheme is the general notion that courts should be
engaged more actively in the pursuit of compensatory justice. In
this sense, what I present here is at odds with the view that dis-
tributive concerns are addressed best through a system of tax and
transfer payments.20 In fact, it seems likely that a system that ren-
ders disadvantaged people dependent on collective action, and al-
lows individuals to rationalize their advantage-taking by reference
to governmental efforts at redistribution, may actually undercut
whatever potential exists for these problems to be addressed
through private orderings.
I am not optimistic that my proposals will be adopted. After all,
if it is true that "the ruling ideas of each age have ever been the
ideas of the ruling class,"'" there would appear to be little hope.
On the other hand, instances in which people pass up free-riding
opportunities,2 2 and the capacity of individuals to empathize 2 and
to conceive of justice as something other than what is always in
20. On the distributive importance of contract law, see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive
and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compul-
sory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); Anthony T.
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Frank I.
Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015
(1978).
21. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 50 (D. Ryazanoff ed.,
1930, reissued 1963).
22. "Free-riding" occurs when individuals attempt to enjoy the benefits resulting from
the efforts of others without making their own contribution. See infra text accompanying
notes 163-68.
23. See generally Lynn H. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574
[Vol. 35:445
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their personal self-interest,24 are all positive signs. Moreover, there
will be no change unless we can continue to discuss the relation-
ship between personality, economics, and justice.25
II. VALUE AND FAIRNESS IN EXCHANGE
When I say that the terms of the exchange generally will favor
individuals from higher social classes,26 I want my meaning to be
clear. First, I am referring to an actual material concept of "terms
of the exchange." In particular, I want to distinguish the subjective
notion of sensing that one has been treated fairly and the actual
material gain that one acquires from the exchange. Obviously,
these two ideas are related in the sense that one's standard of "fair
treatment" will affect the material outcome.
The difference between what a buyer might say an item is worth
and what he or she is willing to pay another party for that item
emphasizes the importance of this distinction. For example, sup-
pose Tim shops for an automobile and, at one lot, spies a 1985
Ford. Tim decides the car is "worth" $5,200;27 therefore, if he buys
(1987) (examining the stories of Supreme Court decisions from the perspective of empathy
and its influence as the deliberation process); see also Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal
Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989)
(advocating a more individualized approach to justice that departs from impersonal and
uniform application of laws).
24. See generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984)
(collecting a series of essays discussing moral education and the development of morality);
Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR
31 (Thomas Lickona ed., 1976) (outlining moral development of individuals and the theory
of moralization that best explains such development).
25. See generally Kelman, supra note 12, at 778-95 (arguing that the assumption made
by welfare economists that free choice maximizes welfare is flawed and ignores certain reali-
ties and constraints imposed by personality, background, and other factors).
26. Obviously, exchanges take place between people at all levels of social class. The idea
here is that exchanges between individuals from similar classes cannot have any important
distributive consequences. Thus, it is the ones betveen members of different classes that
make the difference.
27. Typically, this is called the reservation price-the most Tim is willing to pay for the
car. If Tim were the seller, this would be the least he would take for the car. The reservation
price may change depending on whether one is the seller or buyer of a particular asset. This
rises big problems in the field of law and economics. See Kelman, supra note 10; Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1981). See generally Harrison, supra note 9, at 1357-61 (discussing the effect of wealth on
an individual's preferences). I want to steer clear (pun intended) of calling this the reserva-
1994]
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the car for anything less than $5,200, economists would say that he
has received consumer surplus.2s Furthermore, suppose the car
salesperson is authorized to accept as little as $4,000 for the car. At
this point, a possible exchange may leave both Tim and the car
dealer feeling better off. In fact, so the economists' story goes, any
price below $5,200 gives Tim consumer surplus and any price in
excess of $4,000 gives the car dealer producer surplus. The entire
gain from the exchange is $1,200.29
But the story is far from over. As Paul Samuelson has written,
"rational self-interest does not necessitate that there will
emerge a Pareto-optimal solution that maximizes profits,
in advance of and without regard to how that maximized profit is
to be divided up "SO What this suggests is that the formation
of a contract consists of two steps. The first is the discovery of an
exchange that potentially increases the profit or "surplus" of each
party From the buyer's standpoint, this means discovering an item
that provides more utility than holding the money and spending it
on a different item. The second step is a decision about how to
divide that surplus.3' In other words, having found an exchange
that could make them both feel better off, the parties must agree
on a fair division of the surplus created by the exchange. At this
point, the decisionmaking has a more interpersonal focus. Instead
of considering how his money might best be spent, each trader be-
tion price because I think the actual maximum he would pay will be influenced by the sec-
ondary decision discussed below.
28. This is a dollar measure of Tim's benefit from the bargain.
29. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 120 (1979). Of course, whether this means that overall welfare is enhanced is a
different matter. See Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization As a Normative Princ-
ple, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980) (attacking Judge Posner's theory of wealth maximization as
"incoherent" and arguing that it produces morally objectionable results).
30. Paul A. Samuelson, The Monopolistic Competition Revolution, in 3 THE COLLECTED
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 18, 35 (Robert C. Merton ed., 1972). But see R.H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 159-63 (1988) (arguing that the number of
cases in which the potential for Pareto optimality exists but in which no agreement is
reached is necessarily so small as to be negligible).
31. Some interesting experimental results dealing with the division of the surplus created
by an exchange are found in Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem:
Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982) [hereinafter Hoffman & Spitzer, Ex-
perimental Tests]; Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and
Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985) [hereinafter Hoffman & Spitzer, Fairness].
[Vol. 35:445
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comes concerned with how "good" the deal is relative to how good
it is for the other party At this microeconomic level, the parties
"test" possible prices against their senses of compensatory justice.
If the desire to sense that they have been treated fairly has lexi-
cal priority or is sufficiently powerful, 2 the transaction will not be
consummated when either party believes that the division of the
surplus is compensatorily unjust. I do not address that possibility
here, although it does have important implications.3 Instead, my
concern is with the actual division of the surplus and how it may
vary from individual to individual in a systematic fashion.
For example, Tim and the salesperson must arrive at a price that
both see as a fair division of the gain created by the exchange. For
Tim, the price may not be one that he would quote if asked what
the car is "worth." The seemingly "objective" statement of the
car's worth may be quite different than the most Tim would be
willing to pay and still feel that he has been dealt with justly in the
context of an interpersonal exchange. Suppose Tim asks the price
of the car and is told it is $5,000. After a few minutes of bargain-
Ing, Tim and the salesperson agree on a price of $4,500. I think it
is safe to assume that the price of $4,500 is one that is in some
sense fair to him. Put differently, Tim does not feel strongly enti-
tled to a lower price. We do not know that Tim would have agreed
to a higher price. In fact, it may be that $4,500 was the highest
price Tim actually was willing to pay because it was the highest
price that would have left him with the feeling of havng'received
the share of the division of the surplus to which he was "entitled."
Now suppose Thelma enters the picture and almost everything is
the same. In response to a third party's inquiry as to the worth of
the car she replies, "$5,200." This time the deal is struck at $4,900.
At that price Thelma feels better off and as though she has re-
ceived her fair share of the benefit created by the exchange.
Obviously Tim is better off than Thelma to the tune of $400.
This is the case even though she may feel just as happy about the
32. I have shortened "lexicographical ordering" to "lexical." See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTCE 42-43 (1971). Here it simply means that there are certain principles that cannot
be reduced to conventional notions of utility. See supra note 9.
33. One might regard this search for fairness as entailing transaction costs. If the transac-
tion costs are too high, or there is no point that both parties regard as fair, the exchange will
not occur.
1994]
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contract as Tim felt with his. The critical issue is what accounts
for their ability to feel that they have both been treated justly even
though the terms of the exchange are quite different. This can be
traced to some personality difference that means Thelma's sense of
compensatory justice either is satisfied more easily or is dependent
on things other than the price of the automobile.
The temptation to suggest that the difference can be accounted
for by differences in their negotiating skills or bargaining power is
hard to avoid. Negotiating skills, however, are unlikely to deter-
mine one's feeling of entitlement. These skills are tools for achiev-
ing that to which one already feels entitled. Similarly, bargaining
power suggests an imbalance in the market. If a good is scarce,
sellers will have relatively greater bargaining power than buyers.
But scarcity per se does not translate into the actual use of bar-
gaining power. 4 Although scarcity may influence what one believes
to be a fair price, the primary importance of bargaining power is to
enable one to confidently "back up" the threats she makes in the
negotiation process. The choice of whether to use that power again
is largely a function of an independently determined sense of per-
sonal justice.35
The difference in the sense of entitlement or compensatory jus-
tice is far more pervasive than the bargains made in the preceding
examples. Some students complain about low grades, others do
not. Some people pay the auto repair bill without complaint,
others are upset. Some people accept a wage without feeling re-
sentment, others feel exploited.
Before attempting to pierce the matter of different expectations,
two more points need to be made. The first is that the sense of
34. The reader should not infer from my use of a two party bargaining example that I am
suggesting that the issue discussed here arises only in the context of bilateral monopoly.
Although very competitive markets may make advantage-taking by those with a strong
sense of entitlement difficult, hardly any markets are so competitive that a sense of entitle-
ment would be excluded as a variable in the determination of the terms of an exchange.
Similarly, the fact that Thelma and Tim are buyers should not lead one to infer that my
analysis is confined to decisions by buyers. Obviously, the disadvantaged are often sellers,
probably most crucially in labor markets.
35. See Alvin E. Roth & J. Keith Murnighan, Information and Aspirations in Two-Per-
son Bargaining, in LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMIC AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS: ASPIRATION
LEVELS IN BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING 91, 102 (Reinhard Tietz ed., 1982)
(proposing that higher aspirations lead to tougher bargaining).
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what one is entitled to may be so ingrained that one can feel that
she is entitled to less than someone else. For example, there is no
guarantee that Thelma would become dissatisfied with her auto-
mobile deal if she heard about Tim's deal.36 She might, but she
also may reason that Tim "earned a better deal" by bargaining for
a longer period of time. 7 Alternatively, she might believe that
Tim, an important person in the community, was somehow simply
more deserving. 8 Certainly, the news of Tim's more favorable deal
may change Thelma's view of her own deal, but not if Thelma sees
herself as less deserving than Tim.
The second point that must be addressed is that people can, and
frequently do, make deals that leave them feeling that they have
not been treated fairly 39 Probably the best example of this kind of
deal is an employment contract in which the employee feels un-
derpaid but must take the job in order to make a living. Of course,
as the next section explains, people in dissatisfying arrangements
seem to have an infinite capacity to alter their perceptions of
themselves or their expectations in order to preserve their dignity
III. INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE
Keep you doped with religion and sex and TV
And you think you're so clever and classless and free
But you're still fucking peasants as far as I can see
A working class hero is something to be.40
Two leading theories that seek to explain why people react dif-
ferently to different distributive outcomes are equity theory and
36. See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
37. This is different from feeling that Tim deserves a lower price because he is better at
negotiating. Instead, this is accepting the legitimacy of a reward for the effort Tim has de-
voted to the negotiation.
38. "Status attribution" is one process through which Thelma may find the outcome just.
See Della Fave, supra note 7, at 960-62 (discussing status attribution theory as the process
by which an individual's overall class status is determined by examining that individual's
known characteristics).
39. There are two explanations for this. First, at some price individuals are willing to be
humiliated. Second, even though they may view the preservation of dignity through fairness
in the exchange as lexically prior to most worldly sources of utility, they may, at the same
time, regard survival and providing for their families as lexically prior to maintaining their
own dignity.
40. LENNON, supra note 1.
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relative deprivation theory Although these areas of study have
been considered together and efforts made to integrate them,41
they are sufficiently different to warrant separate consideration.
A. Equity Theory
Equity theory has its roots in social psychology 42 Its fundamen-
tal proposition is that individuals tend to feel that outcomes are
just when the following equation holds:
outcomes of person A outcomes of person B
inputs of person A inputs of person B43
In other words, a distribution is equitable when the ratios of out-
puts to inputs are perceived as being equal. Much of the work in
equity theory is devoted to studying the responses of individuals
when the ratios are not equal.44 For example, workers who feel un-
derpaid-the ratio of their "investments" to their income is lower
than that of others-may not work as hard or may take longer
breaks.45 Conversely, someone who feels overpaid relative to an-
other actually may increase productivity 46
The more important issue for the purpose of this Article is how
individuals determine what factors they will count as relevant in-
puts and outputs. For example, if the disappointed new law profes-
sor in my initial example regards his inputs as higher because he
attended an Ivy League school and his counterpart decides that
her attendance at an Ivy League school is not an input of conse-
41. See Faye Crosby & A. Miren Gonzalez-Intal, Relative Deprivation and Equity Theo-
res, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 141 (Robert Folger
ed., 1984); Joanne Martin & Alan Murray, Distributive Injustice and Unfair Exchange, in
EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 169 (David M. Messick &
Karen S. Cook eds., 1983).
42. Crosby & Gonzalez-Intal, supra njote 41, at 142.
43. Adams, supra note 18, at 276-88; Martin & Murray, supra note 41, at 171.
44. Reaction may be to increase or decrease inputs or to increase or decrease output. For
an extensive bibliography, see J. Stacy Adams & Sara Freedman, Equity Theory Revisited:
Comments and Annotated Bibliography, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 43 (Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Walster eds., 1976).
45. The response may be to alter inputs or to alter outputs. For an example of an input
altering reaction, see research reported by Adams, supra note 18, at 286-87.
46. Id. at 284-88; J. Stacy Adams & William B. Rosenbaum, The Relationship of Worker
Productivity to Cognitive Dissonance About Wage Inequities, 46 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 161
(1962).
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quence, a disagreement will occur as to the equity of the em-
ployer's decision to give them equal moving allowances.
A good and especially accessible example of the implications of
equity theory for the terms of contractual exchanges is found in
the work of Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer in their ex-
periments testing the Coase Theorem.47 In a series of tests, Hoff-
man and Spitzer arranged for two individuals to divide the gains
created by an exchange. In the experiments, each group of two was
given a series of choices. Each choice resulted in a certain mone-
tary payout to the participants. One of the players was designated
the "controller" and was entitled to select any of the alternatives.48
One of the alternatives maximized the payout to the controller and
another maximized the total payout to both parties. The party who
was not designated the controller could attempt to influence the
choice of the controller by a side-payment. For purposes of testing
the Coase Theorem, the issue was whether the two parties would
bargain to reach the outcome that would result in the controller
selecting the joint income-maximizing alternative.
Hoffman and Spitzer discovered that the parties nearly invaria-
bly did select the joint profit-maximizing outcome.49 Perhaps more
interesting was the manner in which the parties divided the profit.
Initially one might hypothesize that the parties would settle on a
split that would leave the controller no worse off than if he had
selected his individual profit-maximizing outcome at the outset. As
it turned out, the division of the payoffs differed dramatically de-
pending upon the way in which the controller was selected. For
example, in their initial experiments, Hoffman and Spitzer's exper-
imental design called for the controller to be determined by the
-flip of a coin. In those cases, the predominant method of dividing
the gain was in equal shares.50
In a second set of experiments, the controller was determined by
playing a simple game. In these instances the researchers at-
47. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests, supra note 3i; Hoffman & Spitzer, Fair-
ness, supra note 31.
48. In the most basic of the "games" there were seven payoff choices with the total payoff
ranging from $11.00 to $14.00. The $14.00 payoff possibility would result in a $10.00 to $4.00
split in the payoff. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests, supra note 31, at 86.
49. Id. at 92.
50. Id.
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tempted to create in the winner a sense of moral authority sug-
gesting that, by winning the game, the winner had "earned" the
right to be controller." In this set of experiments the controller
was far less likely to receive less than the amount available from
selecting his or her joint maximizing outcome.2
The Hoffman and Spitzer experiments suggest that both parties
adopted the same view of the relevant inputs. Thus, in the first
experiments, when the controller was selected by a random event,
the inputs of the parties were the same. In order to keep the equity
formula in balance, the payoff to the parties would also have to be
the same. In the second set of tests, winning the game was re-
garded by both parties as a valid input and, therefore, a higher
payoff was necessary to the controller in order to balance the eq-
uity formula. 3
While the Hoffman and Spitzer experiments are marvelous illus-
trations of how the implications of equity theory can play out, they
leave open the question of precisely how the parties avoid conflict
about what inputs count. Studies in equity theory suggest two
principal ways of avoiding the issue. First, individuals tend to
avoid making comparisons with cohorts who are dissimilar.5 4 Sec-
ond, when such comparisons are made, individuals tend to find jus-
tifications for what would appear to be unequal results by includ-
ing as their counterpart's inputs such things as education or skill.
In essence, they appear to "manufacture" equity 55
B. Relatwe Deprwatin
Relative deprivation theory has its roots in sociology and politi-
cal science. 56 It differs from equity theory in a number of respects,
primarily its emphasis on social comparison. Rather than a tidy
51. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Fairness, supra note 31, at 270-71.
52. Id. at 276.
53. Hoffman and Spitzer attribute a Lockean sense of distributive justice to the partici-
pants because they seemed to be guided by some notion of "desert" as opposed to strict self-
interest in dividing the payoffs. See id. at 261.
54. See Martin & Murray, supra note 41, at 178, 181.
55. See Joanne Martin, Relative Deprivation: A Theory of Distributive Injustice for an
Era of Shrinking Resources, in 3 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 53, 97 (L.L. Cum-
mings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1981).
56. Crosby & Gonzalez-Intal, supra note 41, at 142.
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formula comparing ratios of inputs and outputs, this theory is
characterized by a general process of comparing one's well-being
with the position of others.5 7
As a general matter, one's view of her own situation is based on
whether or not she feels deprived. Deprivation is more likely to
occur when one lacks an outcome, compares herself to someone
who has that outcome, feels entitled to that outcome, feels the out-
come was feasible, and does not blame herself for not achieving the
desired outcome. 8
The critical feature of the theory is that it is capable of explain-
ing why individuals or groups that are absolutely disadvantaged
when compared with other groups actually may feel more content
than members of those groups. The principal example offered to
illustrate relative deprivation theory at work concerns studies of
military personnel during the 1940's. The studies indicated that
airmen were more dissatisfied than military police with the rate of
promotion even though the airmen were promoted more rapidly.
This phenomenon was explained by the fact that the airmen felt
"relatively deprived." '59 In another study, company presidents ex-
pressed greater dissatisfaction than first-line supervisors earning
only one-fourth as much as the presidents. In essence, based on
comparisons with their "reference group," the company presidents
felt deprived even though they were far better off in an absolute
sense than the line supervisors.60
It is useful to note that relative deprivation can be seen as fall-
ing into one of two categories: egoistic deprivation and fraternal
deprivation." In the case of egoistic deprivation, the individual
compares his plight with that of a similar referent, with the em-
phasis on the individual's own well-being. With fraternal depriva-
tion, the scope of the comparison changes; the focus is on the
57. See GEORGE C. HOMANS, SocIAL BEHAVIOR ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 241-42 (rev. ed.
1974).
58. See Morty Bernstein & Faye Crosby, An Empirical Examination of Relative Depri-
vation Theory, 16 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 442 (1980); Faye Crosby, A Model of
Egoistical Relative Deprivation, 83 PSYCHOL. REV. 85 (1976).
59. 1 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE
(1949). For a summary, see Adams, supra note 18, at 269.
60. Edward E. Lawler I & Lyman W Porter, Perceptions Regarding Management Com-
pensation, 3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 41, 46-48 (1963).
61. See RUNCIMAN, supra note 19, at 96; Martin, supra note 55, at 60-67.
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plight of the group of which the individual is a member, as com-
pared to a better situated group. The implications of this distinc-
tion are important because the type of discomfort associated with
fraternal relative deprivation could result in the sort of action that
changes the status of the entire group. 62 Individual transactions
are more likely to raise issues of egoistic deprivation."
Although relative deprivation provides a useful structure in
which to analyze why the individual sense of distributive justice of
some individuals is satisfied with so much less than it would take
to satisfy another, it really only begins the analysis. Simply stated,
if the theory is that we do not sense deprivation as long as we get
that to which we think we are entitled and our entitlement is de-
termined by some reference group, two critical questions emerge.
First, how are reference groups selected? Second, if we do not feel
deprived when we sense we could have controlled the outcome,
what are the factors that determine when we assume responsibility
for the outcomes we experience9
C. Thinking About Fairness
It is useful at this point to revisit the two law professors intro-
duced at the outset and analyze their reactions from the perspec-
tives of equity theory and relative deprivation theory The first law
professor experienced a sense of inequity or deprivation. In equity
theory terms, he made a rough judgment that the reward to his
inputs was disproportionately low when compared to that exper-
ienced by others with whom he chose to compare himself. Or, in
relative deprivation terms, the moving allowance was inconsistent
with his expectation based on how he believed similarly situated
people, perhaps with comparable educations and work experience,
were treated. Alternatively, the second professor, if one applies eq-
uity theory, felt that individuals with inputs similar to her own
would receive roughly the same moving allowance as she did. Or, in
terms of relative deprivation theory, she felt that her peers would
receive a similar moving allowance. The key point is that, for pur-
poses of equity theory analysis, the law professors applied different
standards to identify and evaluate their "inputs" and, for purposes
62. Martin, supra note 55, at 67-69, 99.
63. Martin & Murray, supra note 41, at 186.
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of relative deprivation analysis, they selected different reference
groups.6 4
Equity theory and relative deprivation theory differ in a number
of respects. While equity theory emphasizes inputs and outputs,
relative deprivation theory provides a way of thinking about indi-
vidual concerns and a broader sense of social deprivation. In addi-
tion, equity theory, with its possible tendency toward legitimizing
the status quo, may contain a relatively conservative political
bias . 5 Relative deprivation theory, with its emphasis on explaining
why the disadvantaged do not experience a sense of injustice, can
be seen as having a liberal bias in terms of its research agenda.66
For the purposes at hand, both equity theory and relative depri-
vation theory provide useful frameworks for explaining differences
in the ways individuals respond to differences in the terms of ex-
changes. They do not, however, provide clear answers to the ques-
tion of how uneven outcomes are ultimately accepted as legitimate.
In other words, how is it determined "which inputs count" for pur-
poses of equity theory and how does one learn to accept one refer-
ence group over another for purposes of relative deprivation
theory'
Another question that appears in both theories but in different
forms is that of individual responsibility In relative deprivation
theory, one of the elements necessary for a sense of deprivation to
arise is that the deprived individual have no sense of self-blame for
the outcome.67 In other words, individuals do not feel deprived if
they sense they could have controlled the outcome, even in a vague
way, but did not. It is harder to find an analogous issue in equity
theory because equity theory seems to focus on actual inputs and
64. This might be readily explained if it were discovered that the dissatisfied law profes-
sor was born into a well-to-do family, attended Ivy League schools, served in a prestigious
judicial clerkship, and became friends with those possessing similar backgrounds. The sec-
ond law professor might have come from a working class family, attended state schools, and
worked in a small law firm. These different life experiences could account for their different
reference points when applying their individual senses of justice to the $3,000 moving allow-
ance. See generally BLAU, supra note 7, at 143-67 (stating that past experience and refer-
ence standards influence expectations).
65. Martin & Murray, supra note 41, at 173-77.
66. Id. at 185.
67. See Crosby, supra note 58, at 90.
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outputs.6 8 Seemingly, by implication, the inputs are the responsi-
bility of the individual. One would think, however, that there are
instances in which an individual would feel that the inability to
contribute more inputs is not in his or her power and, therefore, a
difference in outputs is unjust.
Whatever potential there is for developing a sense of injustice in
equity theory due to a "blameless" inability to contribute more in-
puts can be avoided by focusing on the selection of the individuals
to whom comparisons are made. One of the clear conclusions of
equity theory is that individuals prefer to make comparisons to
those who are similar e.6 Thus, those who do experience a sense of
personal responsibility and see themselves as controlling possible
outcomes may tend to compare themselves with those who are also
seen as similarly empowered. A second possibility lies in redefining
what one believes to be just.70 In other words, individuals, espe-
cially from lower socioeconomic levels, may gradually learn to ac-
cept that their inability to contribute more inputs is in reality their
fault. 1
When attempting to address the questions of reference group se-
lection, "which inputs count," and the role of self-blame, a pattern
of answers emerges that suggests that disadvantaged people tend
to adapt in order to accept "what is," as opposed to aspiring to
some greater share of material allocations. In the context of equity
theory, they gravitate toward choosing as their referents individu-
als who are similar and they are careful to define inputs in such a
68. Cf. Helmut Lamm et al., An Attributional Analysis of Interpersonal Justice: Ability
and Effort As Inputs in the Allocation of Gain and Loss, 119 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 269 (1983)
(comparing the effects on outcome when ability and effort are used as inputs).
69. See Martin & Murray, supra note 41, at 178.
70. See Joanne Martin, The Tolerance of Injustice, in RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON: 4 THE ONTARIO SYMpOSIUM 217 (James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986).
71. See SENNETT & COBB, supra note 8, at 20, 28, 249-50; Karen Cook, Expectations,
Evaluations and Equity, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 372 (1975) (discussing the impact of expectation
on the equity process); Morton Deutsch, Awakening the Sense of Injustice, in THE QUEST
FOR JUSTICE: MYTH, REALITY, IDEAL 19, 24-27 (Melvin J. Lerner & Michael Ross eds., 1974)
(arguing that the victim, in an effort to control feelings of injustice, identifies with the Vic-
timizer and internalizes the victimizer's derogatory attitudes); Janice Steil, The Response to
Injustice: Effects of Varying Levels of Social Support and Position of Advantage or Disad-
vantage, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 239 (1983) (finding that social support reduced
the tendency of disadvantaged individuals to assume responsibility for their lower
outcomes).
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way that returns the equity equation to a position of equality Sim-
ilarly, those who otherwise might experience a sense of relative
deprivation seem largely destined to compare themselves to those
who are "equally deprived" and thus avoid the feeling of relative
deprivation. In the words of G.C. Homans, "what people say ought
to be is determined in the long run by what they find in fact
to be the case."'72 In effect, people tend to aspire to distributive
goals that reflect existing allocations as opposed to utopian
outcomes.73
Of course, much of this just begs the issue. What prevents the
disadvantaged from redefining their inputs so that they experience
a sense of inequity when they receive less than another9 Why don't
they choose to use as their point of comparison those who are bet-
ter off9 To rephrase the Homans' quotation: Why does "what is"
turn into what is right?
Put differently, how does the process work through which social
stratification is legitimized even in the eyes of those who are sys-
tematically disadvantaged? There are a number of factors that
seem to interact. One is that we define ourselves as others define
us and rely on their valuation to determine our own worth. Since
the value of a person, by our cultural standards, is largely a func-
tion of his or her power, income, wealth, and education, individuals
apply those standards in order to ascertain how deserving they
are.
7 4
As already noted, in order to feel deprived, one must escape a
sense of personal responsibility for his or her position. It makes
sense that a social structure that leaves us in relatively poor condi-
tion will still be regarded as just or at least as legitimate if we
sense our relatively small allocation is traceable to our own short-
comings. As it turns out, the disadvantaged tend to assume respon-
72. HoMANs, supra note 55, at 250.
73. See Joseph Berger et al., Structural Aspects of Distributive Justice: A Status Value
Formulation, in 2 SOCIoLOGicAL THEORIES IN PROGRESS 119 (Joseph Berger et al. eds., 1972)
(detailing how normative expectations are violated when similar actors receive dissimilar
rewards); Della Fave, supra note 7; Norma Sheplak & Duane Alwin, Beliefs About Inequal-
ity and Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 51 Am. Soc. REv. 30 (1986).
74. See generally Della Fave, supra note 7 (arguing that social stratification is legitimized
by social values).
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sibility for the inferior outcomes they experience. 7 And, interest-
ingly, experiments suggest that even a supportive social structure
cannot overcome this tendency 76 The precise mechanism for this
tendency toward self-blame among the disadvantaged is not clear,
but certainly both the pervasiveness of the American Dream myth
which drives home the notion that everything is available if one
just tries hard enough, 77 and a desire to preserve one's psychologi-
cal well-being by reducing the stress associated with perceiving in-
justice contribute to this tendency 78
A key element playing into the mix is self-esteem. As already
suggested, our self-perceptions are influenced heavily by the views
of others. Indeed, as a statistical matter, self-esteem among adults
is correlated with social class.79 The mechanism here is not hard to
imagine. No one wants to live in a poor neighborhood; no one as-
pires to be poor. Being poor and relatively powerless contribute to
feelings of shame. And being ashamed is synonymous with a lack
of self-love or a sense of personal value. 0
While the lack of self-esteem, without more, can help to explain
the infrequency with which the absolutely deprived experience a
sense of relative deprivation, an even more insidious element is at
work in this process. One of the primary characteristics of those
with low self-esteem is that they are easily influenced.81 For exam-
75. See SENNETT & COBB, supra note 8, at 20, 28, 249-50; Della Fave, supra note 7, at 963;
Steil, supra note 71, at 251. Ironically, they do not appear to take personal credit for good
outcomes. See Lawrence Kutner, Parent and Child, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at C12. On
the other hand, the privileged are likely to view those who are less well-off as responsible for
their plight. See R.A. STEFFENHAGEN & JEFF D. BURNS, THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF SELF-
EsTzM 135-36 (1987).
76. See Steil, supra note 71, at 239.
77. See Deutsch, supra note 71, at 29-30.
78. The effect is to reduce cognitive dissonance, see LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF CoGas-
TivE DISSONANCE 1-31 (1957), in order to avoid stress-related afflictions. See Martin, supra
note 70, at 239-40.
79. See JOHN P HEwrrr, SocIAL STRATIFICATION AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1970);
STEFFENHAGEN & BURNS, supra note 75, at 134-41; Morris Rosenberg & Leonard I. Pearlin,
Social Class and Self-Esteem Among Children and Adults, 84 AM. J. Soc. 53, 55-57 (1978).
80. See GERSHEN KAUFMAN & LEV RAPHAEL, DYNAMICS OF POWER:- FIGHTING SHAME AND
BUILDING SELF-ESTEEM xiii, xvii, 35-36 (2d ed. rev. 1991).
81. See Joel Brockner, Low Self-Esteem and Behavioral Plasticity: Some Implications,
in 4 REvIEw OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 237 (Ladd Wheeler & Philip R. Shaver
eds., 1983); Arthur Cohen, Some Implications of Self-Esteem for Social Influence, in PER-
SONALITY AND PERSUASIBILITY 102 (Carl I. Hovland & Irving L. Janis eds., 1959).
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ple, in experiments involving rewards and in which subjects were
paired with others, low self-esteem subjects were more likely to be-
gin to imitate the reward allocation patterns of their partners than
were high self-esteem subjects. 2 Similarly, subordinates with low
self-esteem are more likely to adopt the values of their supervisors
than those with high self-esteem.8"
This influenceability or "plasticity" has clear implications for
equity theory and relative deprivation theory, as well as for the
cycle of social stratification legitimization. Low self-esteem typi-
cally is associated with uncertainty and a lack of confidence in
one's own attitudes.8 4 Obviously, an important element in the per-
petuation of a system of classes is the ability to convince those on
the lowest rung that they are responsible for their position and
that the values that those in power use to determine status are
appropriate.
In summary, one's sense of whether she has been treated fairly is
the product of comparisons to the input/output ratio of others or
to the general welfare of some reference group. In equity theory,
the central issue is which inputs are worthy of being counted. In
terms of relative deprivation theory, the primary question is which
group does the individual believe she has the "right" to be treated
like. In equity theory, those in power determine which inputs
count. In relative deprivation theory, those who are in worse posi-
tions than others accept comparisons with those who similarly are
deprived because they believe that whatever position they hold in
the social order is of their own making. Pervading, legitimizing,
and sustaining both of these processes is the impact of social strat-
ification on the sense that individuals have of their own worth or
self-esteem. The unrelenting message is that those who receive less
must have less to offer and are ultimately less worthy, and, having
heard this message long enough, individuals become even more
82. See Joel Brockner et al., Reward Allocation and Self-Esteem: The Roles of Modeling
and Equity Restoration, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 844, 847 (1987).
83. See Howard M. Weiss, Social Learning of Work Values in Organizations, 63 J: AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 711 (1978); Howard M. Weiss, Subordinate Imitation of Supervisor Behav-
ior: The Role of Modeling in Organizational Socialization, 19 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. PERFORMANCE 89 (1977).
84. See HEwrrr, supra note 79, at 37-40; Brockner et al., supra note 82, at 846; Kutner,
supra note 75; Weiss, supra note 83, at 712.
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susceptible to it. Disadvantaged people tend not to question a
world that tells them how little they have to offer, how little they
are entitled to, and that they are ultimately to blame.
IV PIERCING PARETO OPTIMALITY
Equity theory and relative deprivation theory can be viewed as
limiting the application of economics to law. Much of the contem-
porary criticism of law and economics asks whether private order-
ings ultimately result in efficient results. For example, both Pareto
optimality and wealth maximization, the two leading measures of
efficiency, depend on a variety of assumptions. The most impor-
tant assumption is that the choices people make reveal their pref-
erences." More generally, Pareto optimality and wealth maximiza-
tion require that we assume away the problems created by the
possibilities of counter-preferential choice,86 preference reversals,8 7
dual preferences,"' and the wealth effect,89 each of which suggests
either that market choices may not reveal preferences or that the
connection between preferences and utility maximization is not
clear."0
What I am addressing here, however, involves an entirely differ-
ent matter. I am assuming that choices do reveal preferences and
that the preferences revealed do increase the utility of the
85. Compare Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference,
15 ECONOMICA 243 (1948) (arguing that a consumer's behavior is based upon revealed prefer-
ences) with Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241
(1973) (arguing that choices made do not always reveal a person's real preferences).
86. See Sen, supra note 9, at 328.
87. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 36-111 (1979) (discussing precom-
mitment to a certain path as being imperfectly rational); Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstem,
Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 596 (1983) (arguing that
preference reversals fit in a larger picture posing a challenge to preference theories); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
ScIENcE 453 (1981) (discussing reversals of preference obtained in choices regarding mone-
tary outcomes and the loss of lives).
88. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. EcoN.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39, 55-56 (1980) (discussing how individuals exercise self-control
through precommitment to certain alternatives).
89. See supra note 27.
90. See generally Kelman, supra note 10 (remarking that legal rules may change con-
sumer demand behavior); Kelman, supra note 12 (arguing that choices may be made be-
cause of duress).
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choosers. If both of these conditions are met, then it seems hard to
argue against the legitimacy of Pareto superiority as a principled
basis for enforcing contracts, but the point of the foregoing discus-
sion is that there are additional questions to be raised. These ques-
tions come from peeling back the skin of Pareto optimality in or-
der to reveal the effect of class-based personality differences on
preferences and the substance of exchanges that individuals regard
as utility-maximizing.
Equity theory and relative deprivation theory suggest that both
the Paretian standard and wealth maximization are extremely
"thin" concepts. For instance, in the automobile example, if we
stop our analysis at the level of efficiency, we would determine that
both Tim and Thelma have experienced increases in their utility
and the world is a generally happier place. But if we peel back
even a single layer of this efficient outcome, we begin to ask why
Thelma would believe she received fair treatment when she paid a
much higher price than Tim. We may find that this efficient out-
come in Thelma's case could only come about because Thelma had
a low sense of entitlement. Moreover, if this lack of a sense of enti-
tlement was determined by some combination of Thelma's social
class and self-esteem, it is reasonable to ask whether we should feel
morally comfortable with the different outcomes.
To expand on this, it is necessary to review the basic notions
underlying the view that Pareto optimality supports the enforce-
ment of contracts. First, this analysis requires a digression into the
basic economic explanation for why exchanges take place.91 One
must start with what economists call indifference curves.92 In Fig-
ure I, the X axis indicates the quantities of good X an individual
might have and the Y axis indicates the amounts of good Y Each
curve plots the possible combinations of X and Y that give the
individual the same amount of satisfaction. For example, X could
be apples and Y bicycles. Each point along a specific curve repre-
sents a different combination of bicycles and apples, but each com-
bmation would leave this individual feeling equally well off. As the
91. I know this is going to be boring but please hang in there. It will be short and I think
it helps illustrate my point. I would like to thank Jules Theeuwes for helping work through
the indifference curve analysis.
92. Most basic economics texts have a good discussion of indifference curves. See, e.g.,
JACK HIRsHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 62-122 (2d ed. 1980).
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curve suggests, as the individual has fewer apples, she must have
more bicycles to maintain the same level of satisfaction. On the
graph, each curve represents a different level of satisfaction with
the curves farther away from the origin representing higher levels
of utility 93 The indifference map of Thelma might look like Figure
I. If Thelma had eighty apples and two bicycles, she would be lo-
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93. It is, perhaps, easier to understand what is happening as one moves to indifference
curves that are farther from the origin if you realize that the graph actually has a third
dimension coming off the page. On this third axis, one would be plotting utility. As the
curves move out, one would be moving up the third axis. In a three dimensional depiction,
the curves would gradually rise up off the page as they move farther from the origin.
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Of course, an exchange requires another participant. Thus, Fig-
ure II depicts the possible indifference curves for Tim. Again, each
curve represents a separate level of satisfaction and shows the
combinations of bicycles and apples that result in the same level of
satisfaction. And, as in Figure I, as the curves move out from the
origin, they represent different and higher levels of satisfaction. If
we suppose Tim has twenty apples and eight bicycles, he will be
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This seemingly lopsided allocation of bicycles and apples obvi-
ously creates an opportunity for exchange. The two indifference
maps can be combined into what is called an "Edgeworth
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Box."'94 In Figure III, the two sets of indifference curves are on the
same graph with Thelma's origin located at the bottom left corner
and Tim's origin at the upper right corner. Point A on the graph is
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The question for contract purposes and for purposes of Pareto
superiority is whether the parties can exchange bicycles for apples
in such a way that they are both better off. In other words, can
they both move to higher indifference curves while being restricted
by the fact that there are a total of one hundred apples and ten
94. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 92, at 192-97 (discussing the "Edgeworth Box" as a tool
to illustrate how exchange allows for mutually advantageous improvement in the allocation
of consumption goods).
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bicycles in the entire economy 9 There are, in fact, a number of
possible points at which both parties would be better off.
To visualize this, consider point B where Thelma's indifference
curve I is tangent to Tim's indifference curve III. The point repre-
sents thirty apples and three bicycles for Thelma and seventy ap-
ples and seven bicycles for Tim. At this point, Thelma is still on
indifference curve I and is as happy as she was with eighty apples
and two bicycles. Tim has moved up to indifference curve III and,
therefore, is better off. In essence, Thelma has paid fifty apples for
one bicycle. While this is actually an unlikely exchange because it
leaves Thelma no better off, it forms the outside limit of a possible
exchange. Similarly, point C, where Tim has five bicycles and fifty
apples and Thelma has five bicycles and fifty apples, represents a
point at which Thelma is better off and Tim stays on his original
indifference curve. This point also represents a limit on their ex-
change because under no circumstances would Tim enter into an
exchange that made him worse off.
Economists refer to the area between indifference curve I for
Thelma and curve I for Tim as a lens.9 All movements from the
original allocation that will leave both parties better off are located
within this lens. Only within this lens exist potential exchanges
that move both parties to higher indifference curves.
Because both parties presumably desire to move to the highest
possible indifference curve (i.e., that which is farthest from their
respective origins), and because these moves must be consistent
with moving to higher indifference curves of their partners, it is
possible to narrow the focus even more. The critical points are
those at which the indifference curves are tangent to each other.
For each indifference curve of Thelma, there is an indifference
curve for Tim that is tangent to Thelma's curve at some point. A
line drawn through these points of tangency is called the contract
curve."6 The contract curve shows a series of possible exchanges or
"prices" of apples in terms of bicycles, or vice versa, that will im-
95. Id. at 195.
96. All of the points on the contract curve are Pareto superior to the original allocation.
They are also Pareto optimal in that it is impossible to move from one point to another
without leaving one of the parties worse off.
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prove the positions of both parties. The actual price the parties
will establish will be determined by their negotiations.
The full contract curve, as illustrated in Figure III, shows the
points which are acceptable to both parties, assuming the parties
are compensatorily insensitive.97 Possibly, however, parties may
view many of these points as involving exchanges that are so une-
ven that they would be unacceptable to at least one of the parties
on the grounds of being compensatorily unfair. In short, there are
two curves: a contract curve, consisting of points that would in-
volve Pareto superior exchanges and another curve that introduces
and accounts for the interpersonal component of the exchange.
The latter curve, as depicted by the bold portion of the full con-
tract curve in Figure IV, is shorter than the original, "compen-
satorily insensitive" curve, and consists of the portions of the origi-
nal curve that are acceptable to both parties. Equity and relative
deprivation theory strongly suggest that, if a portion of the curve is
not in play, that part will lie near the axis of the trading partner
with the greater sense of entitlement. Thus, in Figure IV, the rele-
vant portion of the curve excludes the segment closest to Tim's
axis.9
8
97. One might take the position that the sense of justice or injustice from an exchange of
bicycles for apples is built into the curves. This would not be a correct interpretation of the
curves. The curves do not "anticipate" exchange and the fairness of proposed exchanges.
Instead, they represent different combinations of apples and bicycles that result in different
levels of utility-a purely detached functional analysis. Certainly, when apples are reduced
the person must receive bicycles in order to experience the same level of utility. The "fair-
ness" of this substitution of apples for bicycles, or vice versa, is not a relevant factor as
there is no interpersonal interaction.
98. I fully understand that some will reject the notion that a Pareto superior position
would ultimately be unacceptable to a party. They might reason that an exchange that is
not acceptable must not increase utility and, therefore, could not have been Pareto superior.
As I have already noted, this does not worry me as I do not accept the view that all desired
outcomes are reducible to a single "class" of utility. See supra note 9. For those wedded to
the traditional notion of utility, however, I suggest adopting the view that the "cost" of an
exchange is not just what one gives up in a material sense but any loss in status or pride
that would go along with accepting the proposed terms. Under this interpretation, what I
am saying here is that these psychic costs increase relatively rapidly for those with an ele-
vated sense of entitlement as the material terms of the exchange become less favorable. By
the same token, increasing the self-esteem and sense of entitlement of someone who was
previously disadvantaged, also has the effect of making them require more of what is being
traded for in order to give up what they have to trade. In short, the conclusions suggested
here will not vary even if one feels compelled to go by the more conventional methodology.
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At this point a variety of points remain that leave both parties
feeling better off. Assume that Tim has the greater sense of entitle-
ment and that the two parties agree on an exchange at point D
which happens to require Thelma to give up forty apples for two
bicycles. Both Tim and Thelma feel better off-i.e., are on higher
indifference curves-and, assuming no ill effects on third parties,
overall welfare is increased.
But now suppose everything stays the same except that
Thelma's consciousness is raised and she reevaluates her personal,
sense of desert. As a consequence of this new higher self-esteem
and sense of entitlement, the deal of two bicycles for forty apples
just does not seem fair and is rejected by Thelma. Indeed, Thelma
may now find that most of the terms of the exchange, as shown by
19941
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the contract curve, no longer seem fair. Thus, as shown in Figure
V, Thelma finds acceptable only those exchanges that are close to
Tim's axis and Tim only finds acceptable those exchanges that are
near the axis of Thelma. In effect, we have a contract curve that

















Another, and perhaps more likely, possibility is that the new-
found sense of entitlement for Thelma does not eliminate all the
possible exchange prices that could result in Pareto superior
moves. Instead, as shown in Figure VI, the range of exchange pos-
sibilities has been substantially narrowed, thereby decreasing the
likelihood of finding a mutually agreeable exchange term. After all,
even along the full contract curve in Figure III, the parties may
BICYCLES
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negotiate long and hard and still walk away without an agreement.
In Figure VI, however, the opportunities are few, increasing the
likelihood that no mutually agreeable point will be found. This
may be tantamount to raising transaction costs and higher transac-
tion costs decrease the likelihood of striking a bargain.
FIGUREVI
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In general terms, the curves illustrate that by changing the per-
sonality of one of the participants so that that person has a higher
sense of entitlement, we may decrease the likelihood that a once
mutually beneficial exchange will take place. Increasing a person's
sense of self-worth may decrease his opportunities for arriving at
Pareto superior positions. Conversely, by depriving him of self-
esteem we can create an interpersonal environment consisting of
many more opportunities for increases in efficiency through Pareto
1994]
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superior moves. In its barest form, this means that the more
demeaning an environment, the more likely it is that "efficient"
exchanges will take place. But "efficient" exchanges that are only
possible because of the deprivations that exist in society should
make us think twice about whether they have the moral legitimacy
necessary to be enforced by contract law
More importantly, from the standpoint of this Article, a change
in the parties' relative senses of compensatory justice affects the
division of the surplus created by the exchange. When the division
consistently is lopsided in favor of the more privileged party, ques-
tions of moral legitimacy also arise.
Let me put this latter point in more vivid terms. Suppose a
black child grows up in a racist community and knows nothing
other than being treated with suspicion and disdain. When he
grows up, he is perfectly happy with a job similar to that occupied
by whites but for which he is paid a salary equal to only two-thirds
that paid to whites. Moreover, the employer would not pay a salary
as high as that paid to a white person. Presumably, we have mi
creased efficiency due to the fact that the employer and employee
have moved to higher indifference curves. But the division of the
surplus from the trade, and perhaps the existence of the contract
itself, can be explained by the fact that the black employee has
been taught to be satisfied with less than his white counterpart. In
terms of equity theory, he has been taught that his inputs are, in a
literal sense, less worthy In terms of relatwe deprwatin theory,
he does not feel as though the wage is unfair because it is equal to
that received by those to whom he compares himself.
We are faced, however, with the possibility that through years of
consciousness-raising the black person is able to overcome his
sense of inferiority " By viewing his inputs as being as valuable as
those contributed by whites or by broadening the range of those
99. This consciousness-raising has the effect of "delegitimnzing the stratification." See
Della Fave, supra note 7, at 966-68 (arguing that delegitimization comes when incongruence
develops between distribution of primary resources and self-evaluations); Deutsch, supra
note 71, at 33-34 (arguing that raising a sense of injustice to people's consciousness creates a
source of social organization and cohesion); Martin, supra note 55, at 66-67 (noting studies
that demonstrate that Northern blacks had a greater sense of entitlement than Southern
blacks because Northern blacks compared their economic status with that of whites while
Southern blacks restricted such comparison to other blacks).
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included in his social comparison process and thus experiencing a
sense of relative deprivation, he now finds the lower salary unac-
ceptable. The loss of dignity would be too great to offset the finan-
cial gain. One possibility is that a higher wage will be received. On
the other hand, if the employer sticks to his race-based wage struc-
ture, the employment contract will not be made, and arguably, a
possible Pareto superior exchange will be foregone because of the
employee's new self-valuation.
The same sort of analysis can be applied to the situation found
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.'00 Suppose that the
exchange in that case, even if Williams fully understood the add-
on clause in her contract with Walker-Thomas, fell squarely on the
contract curve. In that instance, both parties would have exper-
ienced increases in utility Again, the possibility looms that the
bargain was only possible because of Williams' low self-im-
age-"it's not a great deal," she realizes, "but that's what those of
us in the inner city must be happy with and it is what we deserve."
Suppose Williams begins to spend time around people who help
her to develop a greater sense of personal dignity or that because
the terms offered to her have been labelled "unconscionable" by a
court, exchanges that once seemed fair to her no longer seem
fair.' 10 The terms offered by Walker-Thomas seem unacceptable
because she now feels relatively deprived. It is important to note
that she rejects the Walker-Thomas offer not simply because she
100. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Mrs. Williams made a series of credit purchases from
the Walker-Thomas store totalling over $1800. Id. at 447 n.1. The collateral for each
purchase was not just the item purchased but all items on which she had an outstanding
balance. Id. at 447. Each payment was credited to each item on a proportionate basis. Id.
Thus, under the terms of the agreement, " 'the amount of each periodical installment pay-
ment shall be inclusive of and not m addition to the amount of each installment pay-
ment under prior accounts; and all payments made shall be credited pro rata
on all outstanding accounts '" Id. (quoting the contract) (alterations in original).
In effect, Williams could not pay off any one item until all the items were paid off. Id. At a
point when her balance was $164, Williams purchased another item. Id. at 447 n.1. Upon her
default, the Walker-Thomas store attempted to repossess all of the items she had purchased
under the "add-on" terms. Id. at 447.
For defense of this type of contract provision, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:
A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 293, 306-07 (1975). See also Schwartz, supra note 10
(arguing that inadequate information should be the only factor of nonsubstantive unconscio-
nability to invalidate an agreement). For a different view, see Robert Braucher, The Uncon-
scionable Contract or Term, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 337, 343-44 (1970).
101. See tnfra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
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thinks there are better deals elsewhere, but because she now feels
deserving of those exchanges.
In both the employment example and the Walker-Thomas possi-
bility, the question is whether the terms of the exchange or the
exchange itself are possible only because of the respective classes,
and resultant self-images, of the parties. Whatever the philosophi-
cal basis, I think that at some level, exchanges and terms that exist
as consequences of the difference in senses of entitlement make us
uncomfortable. Indeed, it is a very shallow notion of fairness that
is based on a concept of efficiency that is, at least in some part,
dependent on the deprivation and devaluation of individuals.
V PREFERENCES, PERSONAL AUTONOMY, AND DISTRIBUTIVE
OUTCOMES
A. Adaptations to Class
The preceding section spells out in technical economic terms
why relative deprivation theory and equity theory provide strong
foundations for excusing individuals from their contracts. A line of
reasoning opposing such action could be based on the view that
people, in terms of preference, are as we find them 02 and interfer-
ence with their private orderings impinges on their liberty by sub-
stituting their preferences and personalities with those we wish
they had. In addition, any response that excuses them from their
choices might be regarded as unduly paternalistic. More specifi-
cally, one might argue that I simply am saying that my preference
is that disadvantaged people act more assertively in bargaining
contexts.10 3 At a different and more troublesome level, though, the
intervention may reflect a desire that individuals have a sense of
compensatory justice that mirrors our own.104
102. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus non Est Disputandum, 67 Am.
ECON. REV. 76 (1977) (asserting that tastes are stable over time and do not vary widely
between different people).
103. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1361-62 (questioning how much weight one's own
preferences should be given when making policy decisions regarding the preferences of
others). See generally C. Dyke, The Vices of Altruism, 81 ETHics 241 (1971) (positing that
when one has fewer alternatives, self-interest is more motivating than the common good).
104. In a sense, we want them to feel they deserve a greater share of the gains from the
exchange.
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An easy response to these objections may be that we really are
not interfering with preferences at all. Arguably, every self-inter-
ested and rational person wants as much of the surplus created by
the exchange as possible. In addition, it is hardly paternalistic to
help someone achieve a goal-greater wealth-which we know they
desire but which they do not believe they deserve. Indeed, as a
general rule, it does not seem to be paternalistic to intervene if the
subject of our intervention would immediately defend our actions,
as seems likely in this context.105 Even if they do not want more, it
seems safe to predict that they would prefer to have a greater
sense of desert. That is, they might say, "Yes, I would like to feel
more deserving."
But all of this makes it too easy to avoid the issues of autonomy
when interfering with the joint decisions individuals have made
about distributive outcomes. First of all, we may be dealing with a
preference that transcends day-to-day preferences, such as wine
rather than soft drinks or Mozart rather than the Rolling Stones.
Arguably, people accept less because they honestly have their own
standards for distributive outcomes and strive to achieve "fair-
ness" as they see it. In other words, they may adhere to their own
belief as to what constitutes compensatory justice as a matter of
principle or lexical ordering. If this is the case, intervening on the
basis of what we would like them to prefer as a matter of compen-
satory justice is not much different than attempting a religious
conversion.
Another possibility is that individuals are comfortable with less
because they desire to avoid the risk of humiliation if they ask for
more and are refused. Indeed, embedded in the analysis of equity
theory and relative deprivation theory is a preference-like notion
that has to do with how much of the surplus from the exchange is
enough to make these individuals feel they have been treated
fairly In essence, some individuals "prefer," or are comfortable
with, less of the surplus. In utilitarian terms, one might argue that
there is safety in asking for less and in "staying in one's place." A
related but slightly different possibility is that one may derive
some perverse pleasure from being what outsiders may regard as
deprived. This would also have a utilitarian basis with the individ-
105. See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 572.
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ual preferring to think of herself or to have others think of her as a
"victim." In all of these cases, interfering with the compensatory
preference is far more fundamental than helping someone to over-
come her preference for smoking or television or even for contracts
with disclaimers.
A 1986 article by Cass Sunstem is helpful in questioning the le-
gitimacy of interfering with preferences. 10 6 Sunstem meticulously
lays out the reasons we are sometimes able to overcome our hesi-
tancy to interfere with expressed preferences. His "catalogue," in-
cludes four categories. First is the possibility that a majority will
choose to "bind itself against the satisfaction of its own misguided
choices.' 110 7 In effect, the majority may choose to eliminate some
choices in order to channel behavior toward choices that they
would prefer to have. The second category involves preferences
that are themselves the product of legal rules. 0 8 The third cate-
gory concerns efforts to curb choices that depend on "addictions,
habits, or myopic behavior."' 09 Finally, preferences that stem from
"cognitive distortions" 10 may also be fair game for interference.
The simplest example of a cognitive distortion is a choice that re-
sults from a lack of information.
I am tempted to say that interfering with contracts purely on the
basis of the questionable legitimacy of the compensatory outcomes
can be justified entirely by reference to Sunstem's fourth category
In effect, the personal sense of compensatory justice that drives
one to reveal a preference for a lopsided distribution is a function
of the lack of accurate information the individual has about his
own moral worth or the value of his own inputs as compared to the
value of the inputs of others. For example, a belief that individuals
are of equal moral worth may lead one to believe that he need not
take a smaller share of the surplus created by exchanges."' Simi-
106. Cass A. Sunstem, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CH. L. RFv.
1129 (1986).
107. Id. at 1138.
108. Id. at 1138-39; see also Elster, supra note 7, at 141-48.
109. Sunstem, supra note 106, at 1139.
110. Id.
111. In essence, the "choice" to take less may be a result of class-driven feelings of self-
esteem. Low self-esteem is then the result of a faulty self-valuation process. In other words,
the choice to take less may be the result of inaccurate information about one's value vis-h-
vis that of others.
[Vol. 35:445
CLASS, PERSONALITY, AND CONTRACT
larly, knowledge that the definition of "valued inputs" is a func-
tion of inequities in class and power may reduce the tendency to
accept subordinate status. In effect, preferences based on made-
quate or inaccurate information are fair game for judicial interfer-
ence. 112 Although this argument is appealing in some sense, it does
not really seem to match the sorts of cognitive errors that Sunstem
sees as fitting into category four.113 This lack of information is not
of the same ilk as smoking when one has not heard of the health
risks associated with smoking.
This category, however, can blend with category two, which
deals with the adaptations that individuals make to existing laws
or power imbalances that themselves result from the legal system.
Before addressing this blending possibility, I will focus on the two
types of adaptations that could account for the tendency of disad-
vantaged individuals to prefer to accept without protest the prefer-
ences others have for what the disadvantaged person should feel
about compensatory fairness.
Adaptation in this context means that the preferences expressed
by individuals are not their own, in a true sense, but are dependent
on law.114 The first type of adaptation is fairly straightforward. De-
spite what most contract law professors teach their students, the
common person generally believes that a "contract is a contract."
In fact, the doctrine that the law will not refuse to enforce a con-
tract simply because of the lack of adequate consideration seems
well known, at least at an intuitive level, to virtually everyone. For
example, if contract law falls to directly address issues of adequacy
of consideration, and bargains like those in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co." 5 are enforced routinely, one begins to ac-
cept those bargains as "just." After all, laws are designed to pro-
mote justice, aren't they? Furthermore, the inequality of the divi-
112. They are fair game m the sense that the "preference" revealed is based on inaccurate
information. They are also fair game due to the possible therapeutic value of having courts
routinely vindicate those who have undervalued themselves. See infra notes 175-82 and ac-
companying text.
113. See Sunstem, supra note 106, at 1166-69 (stating that intervention in decisionmak-
ing is less objectionable when one does not know all the relevant information).
114. One might view the distinction as being between "pure preferences" and "dependent
preferences" with the latter reflecting adaptations to law and ideology.
115. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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sion of the surplus also will be viewed as having the moral
authority of the law 1I In short, people's views of what is "just"
are to some extent dependent on what the law implicitly labels as
"just." Moreover, if they have been on the short end of a deal, are
from a low social class and, consequently, have low self-esteem,
they will be quick to accept the views of others that they have only
themselves to blame.117
This general response to an intuitive sense of the law is probably
not enough to explain why some individuals seem to prefer, or feel
comfortable with, consistently being on the short end of bargains,
whether in employment contracts, housing contracts, automobile
sales contracts, or insurance contracts. A broader adaptation that
accounts for this "willingness" routinely to be the contract victim
can be explained by reference to "ideology" Sunstein describes
these preferences as "desires and beliefs that derive from relations
of power."118 In this context, the "preference" is really a psycholog-
ical adjustment or resignation to power imbalances that cannot be
overcome.' It is, in fact, a way of avoiding the dissonance and
stress that would occur if one began to question the legitimacy of
his status.
The manifestation of this adaptation can be found in the re-
sponses individuals express when asked about apparent inequities.
For example, Professor Joanne Martin offers a variety of ways in
which individuals learn to adapt to injustice. 120 Two of the more
powerful descriptions are as follows:
(He), youngest of three children, lived with his mother in an
8-story apartment in the South Bronx, a mostly black and Pu-
erto Rican neighborhood. "I didn't know any different. I didn't
116. Cf. Hoffman & Spitzer, Fairness, supra note 31 (using a laboratory test to ascertain
the source of generally held notions of fairness or morality and discussing the implications
of the test results for the legal system).
117. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
118. Sunstem, supra note 106, at 1152; see also Elster, supra note 7, at 145 (positing that
the oppressed have a tendency to regard their oppressive social order as being just, and that
this tendency may be due to an illusion among the oppressed that they owe their livelihood
to their oppressors).
119. Cf. Kelman, supra note 12 (arguing that consumers will attempt to evade the duress
of market powers when possible).
120. See Martin, supra note 70.
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have anything to compare it to I didn't see it as tough. It
was my home."
An Appalachian woman was hired by the Office of Economic
Opportunity to work as a community organizer in her own im-
poverished black neighborhood. She spent her time making fruit
pies for her poorer neighbors. When asked by a friend how she
felt about the amount of money she was earning in this job (her
income was slightly above the poverty line), she replied, "I am
very content; I have more than my neighbors." Her friend con-
tinued, "What about the people on 'the hill"" (This was a
wealthy residential area, clearly visible from the organizer's
front yard.) She answered, "My life is here. I don't think about
them."12 '
At this point, the matter of preference determination merges
with relative deprivation theory and equity theory The valuations
either of the relative inputs and outputs in the context of equity
theory or of the lack of a sense of deprivation among those who
objectively are deprived in the case of relative deprivation theory
are hard to equate with the true or "pure" preferences of the indi-
viduals. They are preferences influenced by, perhaps even created
by, outside factors.
As I mentioned, the adaptation rationale for not taking observed
indications of preferences at face value blends with Sunstein's cat-
egory four which deals with problems stemming from inadequate
information.122 This blending is important because the problem of
adaptive preferences would be far less troublesome if individuals
had the information to assess their own preferences, to evaluate
how they are formed, and to at least consider the possibility of
having preferences other than the ones they have. Not only are the
preferences not independent of law, but, as a cognitive matter, in-
dividuals are without the type of information or introspection that
would permit them to alter their expectations for themselves. 123
121. Id. at 217.
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
123. For one description of the difficulties involved in overcoming one's adaptive prefer-
ences, see KAUFMAN & RAPHAEL, supra note 80, at 30-52 (discussing the development of
inner security and self-esteem).
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Seen in this light, there is no powerful autonomy-based moral
objection to intruding on individuals' choices to consistently un-
dervalue themselves and their contributions as compared to the
contributions of others. To view the process as one of interfering
with liberty is simply to legitimize the system that has distorted
the self-valuations and senses of entitlement that individuals have.
B. A Comparison to Informal Dispute Resolution
An analogy can be drawn here to the arguments that have been
made in the context of informal dispute resolution. Informal dis-
pute resolution can injure the powerless at both a macro level and
a micro level. At the macro level, it may siphon off disputes that, if
resolved in a formal setting, could begin a general movement to-
ward reform. 124 It also can dampen the festering social discontent
that otherwise might lead to collective action for change. 125
The micro level dangers are more interesting for the purpose of
this discussion because informal dispute resolution typically in-
volves the negotiation of a contract. Although the contracts en-
tered into as a means of settling disputes, where the pressures to
contract are great, may be seen as different from those made in a
more voluntary context, the concerns raised carry over to day-to-
day private orderings. Indeed, contracts about the necessities of
life and employment are even less voluntary than those designed to
settle disputes.
Increasingly, legal scholars have expressed concerns that infor-
mal dispute resolution is dangerous to those groups who, in terms
of this Article, have a relatively low sense of entitlement. 12 6 These
124. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086 (1984) (arguing that
settlement masks society's "basic contradictions"); Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Jus-
tice and the Social Control Problems of American Capitalism: A Perspective, in 1 TiE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 207, 223-24 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982).
125. See RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE Ex-
PANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE 82 (1987) (discussing how informality facilitates early inter-
vention which helps to prevent social disruption); Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of
Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267, 280-95 (Richard L. Abel ed.,
1982) (describing how informal legal institutions neutralize conflict by responding to griev-
ances before they ripen into serious challenges to the State).
126. See Richard L. Abel, Conservative Conflict and the Reproduction of Capitalism:
The Role of Informal Justice, 9 INT'L J. Soc. L. 245, 257 (1981) (noting how in a class society
informalism benefits those with greater power); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
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scholars claim that weaker parties are actually better off When dis-
putes are resolved in a formal, as opposed to an informal, set-
ting.127 To be specific, the case has been made that the formal set-
ting encourages the parties, including the stronger parties, to
aspire to higher values. 28 In addition, the formal setting insulates
the parties and avoids the intimate contact that allows the
stronger party to dominate. 12
9
Mediation is a good example of a method of informal dispute
resolution that gives rise to these concerns. 30 Ideally, mediation
allows the parties to define what they consider to be a "just" out-
come. In effect, the parties come together with the goal of achiev-
ing an outcome that is consistent with each party's sense of justice
as influenced by ideology 131 Their sense of justice in this context,
however, is largely a function of their personal sense of entitle-
ment. The "preferences" and, therefore, the outcome, of the infor-
mal process can be less equal than that resulting from a more for-
mal setting in which the ritual may elevate the integrity of the
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1564-67 (1991) (discussing how certain
groups tolerate injustice because they do not feel entitled to assert their rights); Frances
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1497, 1541-42 (1983) (asserting that "deformalized" procedure, e.g., family court, may
have adverse effects on women in that attempts at conciliation often subject women to more
injury and welfare of the weaker parties often depends on "the uncontrolled discretion of
state agencies").
127. See Abel, supra note 126, at 295-301; Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formal-
ity: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
1359, 1387-88.
128. See Delgado et al., supra note 127, at 1387-88; John Thibaut et al., Procedural Jus-
tice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1288-89 (1974) (suggesting that the adversary system
is perceived as more just and encourages more diligent representation of parties by their
attorneys).
129. See Abel, supra note 127, at 257; Delgado et al., supra note 127, at 1388; Grillo,
supra note 126, at 1550, 1597-600; Olsen, supra note 126, at 1542.
130. See, e.g., HOFRICHTER, supra note 125, at 82; Grillo, supra note 126 (challenging the
notion that mediation is fairer or more humane); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 57, 71-97 (1984) (discussing the various criticisms of mediation in the wife-abuse con-
text, and arguing that prosecution is the only appropriate remedy); Laurie Woods, Media-
tion: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431
(1985) (arguing that mediation in family law disputes denies women the opportunity to de-
velop and enforce new rights).
131. See generally Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34-35
(1982) (stating that certain assumptions of the parties to a "mediation affect the procedures
and results achieved in [the] mediation[]").
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weaker party As Richard Abel, the leading critic of informal dis-
pute resolution, posits: "compromise produces unbiased results
only when opponents are equal; compromise between unequals in-
evitably reproduces inequality ,,132 Moreover, the outcome is more
dangerous in that the sense of being treated in an arbitrary fash-
ion, which might provide the basis for reform, is lost.133
Writers have noted especially the dangers of informal dispute
resolution for women.134 For example, if in fact women are more
altruistic than men, in that they are more nurturing and interested
in preserving relationships, the informal setting in which they ne-
gotiate with men who do not share the same values can result in
material disadvantages for women. In essence, if the cost of indi-
vidual material gain is the destruction of the relational interest,
some women do not feel entitled to pay the price.13 5 This sense of
the proper role, "place," or even behavior of women in informal
dispute resolution can be generalized to the sense of "place" or en-
titlement of any person engaged in a negotiation. 13
The day-to-day private orderings of individuals embody all of
the dangers of informal dispute resolution and then some. The ab-
sence of formality liberates the parties to respond to their baser
motivations. The close interpersonal contact forces the weaker
party, typically the party with greater plasticity, 37 to listen to the
stronger party's view on what is fair. An important distinction ex-
ists between day-to-day private orderings and informal dispute
resolution that means the former is even more likely to be damag-
ing to weaker parties. In informal dispute resolution there is at
least a quasi-formality in the sense that even the weaker party rec-
132. Abel, supra note 126, at 257.
133. Id. at 259.
134. Sources discussing the problems resulting from mediation or general lack of formal-
ity in the context of family and gender-related disputes include: Grillo, supra note 126;
Lerman, supra note 130; Olsen, supra note 126; Janet Rifkm, Mediation from a Feminist
Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 21 (1984) (examnmg mediation in the
separation and divorce context and the sexual harassment context and discusssing a variety
of criticisms of mediation); and Woods, supra note 130.
135. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 126, at 1601-05 (arguing that women have a relational
sense of self, focusing on connections with others rather than on individualism).
136. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 125, at 73; Abel, supra note 126, at 257; Delgado et al.,
supra note 127, at 1360.
137. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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ognizes the existence of a dispute and the need to defend her own
interests, however those interests might be defined. In the day-to-
day context, though, even those guards are down.
VI. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ENTITLEMENT
Although courts can adopt a variety of contract doctrines in or-
der to respond indirectly to advantage-taking,138 the most direct
response to contracts resulting in uneven exchanges would be an
expanded notion of unconscionability I do not intend here to go
into great detail about how this might be done. 3 In the first sec-
tion below, I sketch how my version of unconscionability would
differ from the way in which it currently is applied. In the second
section, I will discuss in more general terms the potential of an
expansion of substantive unconscionability as a means of educating
individuals and shaping their senses of entitlement. I respond to
the typical "law and economics" concerns about expanding uncon-
scionability by illustrating how the perspective changes when un-
conscionability is used as a preference-shaping tool.
A. Revising Unconscwnability
As every first year law student knows, a consideration of uncon-
scionability begins with Arthur Leff's analysis. 40 Professor Leff di-
vides the topic into two categories: problems in the bargaining pro-
cess, procedural unconscionability, and pure unfairness in the
exchange, substantwe unconscionability '4 Although his two-
138. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 4 (discussing the doctrines of mental infir-
mity, incompetency, misrepresentation, and fraud); Ellinghaus, supra note 14, at 788 (citing
LON L. FULLER & ROBERT BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 180-81 (1964), for the proposi-
tion that there are at least nine established contract doctrines in response to advantage-
taking); Gordley, supra note 15, at 1649-55 (suggesting that many cases decided under com-
mon contract doctrines were actually decided under unconscionability standards); Horowitz,
supra note 14, at 941 (noting the theories of duress, fraud, and lack of capacity).
139. I do not mean to suggest that there are not details to work out. I have a sense,
however, that anyone agreeing with the propositions set forth will agree that an express
expansion of unconscionability is quite practical. On the other hand, readers who reject
most of what has been said and what is to come will be more likely to think of such a change
as impractical.
140. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
141. Id. at 486-87, 489-501, 509-16.
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pronged analysis is an interesting way to approach the issue, it is
not terribly useful.'42 If there is procedural unfairness, but not un-
fairness in the exchange, there is no issue to address. In all likeli-
hood, however, when there is substantive unfairness, procedural
unfairness of some form is also nearby 143 If so, there seems to be
little need to fit it into an appropriate procedural pigeonhole.
To a great extent, Melvin Eisenberg takes this view in his impor-
tant and thorough article, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits. 44
Professor Eisenberg identifies a trend toward reacting to unfair-
ness without regard to some sign of a procedural defect, but there
remains a great deal of ambivalence toward responding solely to
unfairness in the bargain. 4 5 Thus, although the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts discusses the "theoretical" possibility of such a
response, it notes that "[o]rdinarily, , an unconscionable con-
tract involves other factors as well as overall imbalance.' 14 The
Restatement suggests that unequal bargaining power accompanied
by terms that are favorable to the stronger party may mean that
"the weaker party had no meaningful chdice, no real alternative, or
did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.' 147
This discomfort with responding directly to simple unfairness m
the exchange ironically is exhibited in Professor Eisenberg's article
itself. Although his thesis seems to state that courts are more
ready than ever to dispense with the need for a procedural element
of unconscionability, much of the article is devoted to the discus-
sion of unconscionability categories that look remarkably like dif-
ferent versions of procedural unfairness. 4 In this context he dis-
cusses four categories of cases in which the enforcement of
bargains might be limited on the basis of unconscionability The
first category involves bargains made when one of the parties was
142. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 754 (stating that "[tihe distinction between proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability is too rigid to provide significant help").
143. See Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative Approach,
68 N.D. L. REV. 145, 169 (1992) ("[T]here will be few instances where a contract is so one-
sided as to [be substantively unconscionable] absent some strong evidence of [procedural
unconscionability].").
144. Eisenberg, supra note 14.
145. Id. at 752-54.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1979).
147. Id. § 208 cmt. d.
148. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 754-85.
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in distress and had little choice but to accept the offer made by the
other party.14 9 Professor Eisenberg's second category involves
"transactional incapacity" which seems to include those instances
m which even people of average intelligence may not be capable of
understanding the implications of complex bargains. 150 The third
category, "unfair persuasion," involves the "use of bargaining
methods that seriously impair the free and competent exercise of
judgment." 151 The final category envisions "price ignorance" in
which the price offered is taken as a kind of warranty that it is
representative of the "prevailing price. '152
While I probably could squeeze any exchange that I would re-
gard as unconscionable into one of Professor Eisenberg's catego-
ries,15 3 that exercise would be unnecessary, because even Professor
Eisenberg does not view his list of categories as being all-inclusive.
Instead, he states that "unconscionability is a paradigmatic con-
cept that can never be exhaustively described." 54 In addition, the
critical element of Professor Eisenberg's methodology was to iden-
tify cases m which neither "fairness nor efficiency support the bar-
gain principle's application. ' 1 55 This, in large measure, is consis-
tent with the analysis in the preceding two sections. If one's
consent to the terms of a contract is the function of class-based
injuries, it is hard to defend the bargain on either fairness or effi-
ciency grounds. 56
I would deviate from the Eisenberg model in one important
way-the classification of unconscionability cases is not only un-
necessary but counterproductive. I am concerned about an ap-
proach in which the disadvantaged party is seen as a victim that
149. Id. at 754-63.
150. Id. at 763-73.
151. Id. at 773-74.
152. Id. at 778-85.
153. For example, although Professor Eisenberg's "unfair persuasion" category seems to
involve methods used by advantage-taking parties, much of the problem discussed in this
paper has to do with the possibility that some classes of people are more easily persuaded
than others. This could be regarded as "unfair persuasion."
154. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 754.
155. Id.
156. Both the fairness and efficiency elements of Pareto superiority are grounded in the
idea that the parties have consented. When that consent is contingent on class-based inju-
ries it is hard to defend the exchange from the standpoint of fairness or efficiency.
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the law has more or less rescued."5 This suggests some element of
subordination which, in a subtle way, cuts against the elevating
and vindicating effects that are more productive. In order for rou-
tine use of unconscionability to have the effect I am suggesting, it
is important to avoid the taxonomy of victims."" More specifically,
I think the therapeutic effects of more routine use of unconsciona-
bility would be undercut terribly if the party wishing to avoid the
contract were required to prove that he truly was poor, passive,
helpless, or lacked self-esteem.
I envision three basic distinctions between the use that I see for
unconscionability and the way it is currently applied. First, the fo-
cus would be strictly on substantive fairness without any require-
ment that unconscionability have a procedural element. Thus, the
sole question would be whether the exchange was fair.159 In the
157. Professor Lesnick states that the "radical" approach to greater use of unconsciona-
bility would involve recognition that the party "see himself as a victim of abuse, rather than
as someone who has made a mess of things." Lesnick, supra note 17, at 437. Certainly
this is consistent with the view here that class stratification is maintained in part because
those who are worse off believe they are responsible for their position. While I agree with
Professor Lesnick, my point here is that an affirmative showing of one's weakness in a judi-
cial setting seems inconsistent with the proper type of consciousness-raising.
I realize that not requiring a party to prove his or her weakness would mean that the
proposal would not limit the use of unconscionability to those who are from lower classes
who have dealt with higher class advantage-takers. The fact that bargains between disad-
vantaged parties, between advantaged parties, and between parties from different classes in
which the party from the lower class has somehow received the larger share of the gain from
the exchange may be affected, does not seem to me to be very important. The bargains
between individuals from the same class will have no distributive impact. Thus, it becomes
an empirical question of whether the advantaged or disadvantaged segments of society will
benefit more from an expanded application of unconscionability. My sense is that members
of the class that is more often on the short end of the bargain will more often wish to avoid
the contract.
158. I am sure the comparison is not entirely accurate and I have been unable to track
down its origins, but I am reminded by Toni Massaro of the shift from the phrase "rape
victim" to "rape survivor." See Massaro, supra note 23, at 2112.
159. This view is hardly unprecedented even in the United States. See Eisenberg, supra
note 14, at 752-53; Gordley, supra note 15, at 1645-55; see also A.H. Angelo & E.P Ellinger,
Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Approaches in England, France,
Germany, and the United States, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 455 (1992) (comparing
common law and civil law jurisdictions and finding a focus on "usurious price" only in some
jurisdictions); Franco Taisch, Unconscionability in a Civil Law System: An Overview of
Swiss Law, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 529 (1992) (finding that the Swiss law dealing
with unconscionability focuses on disparity of consideration and weakness of one party).
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terms of Professor Gordley's article, Equality in Exchange,"'° I
would look to whether one party has been "enriched at the other's
expense. ' 161 No real investigation into procedural niceties is re-
quired here. The second variation would be that the "fairness of
the exchange" be a question of fact.16 2 This cuts against the origins
of unconscionability as an equitable doctrine, but should not pre-
vent the adoption of a jury question approach. The objective is to
evaluate the issue of fairness from a more general social norm,
rather than from a judge's possibly privileged perspective. Finally,
any finding of substantive unconscionability should be accompa-
nied by a form of public notice. In essence, the community should
be notified of those individuals or firms that have been found to
have acted "unconscionably" I will discuss the importance of this
latter element when I return to the educative value of unconscio-
nability in the following section.
B. The Educative Effect of Unconscionability
As I noted m the Introduction, my principal point is to suggest
that the routine use of unconscionability may have the effect of
altering the expectations that individuals have about the bargains
they make and what they deserve in those bargains. This is not
meant to imply that I personally do not favor the use of unconscion-
ability strictly as a means of achieving equality My point is that if
routine use of unconscionability had the desired effect of teaching
the traditionally disadvantaged that they are as deserving as the
relatively privileged, then the need for judicial intervention at all
levels, which has as its goal the equalization of individuals in a
material sense, could be greatly lessened. In effect, there is an im-
mediate and short-run equalizing effect and, perhaps more impor-
tant, a longer run "therapeutic" effect.
160. Gordley, supra note 15.
161. Id. at 1637.
162. Competitive market price and the seller's cost would be evidence of the fairness of
the exchange. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 749-50 (arguing that "[i]f the price was not
set by a mechanism that is regarded as fair, such as a competitive market, it may not be
unfair to revise it judicially"); Gordley, supra note 15, at 1613-14 (arguing that "a price that
covers costs is both an ideal minimum and an ideal maximum because at that price the
wealth of the parties remains constant").
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To some extent-and I cannot say exactly to what extent-my
admittedly slight optimism that a generalized sense of equal self-
esteem and entitlement could be achieved is fueled by the numer-
ous examples of behavior indicating that individuals have, at some
level, a consciousness about standards of fairness that exists apart
from narrowly defined notions of self-interest. Whether leaving a
tip at a restaurant on an interstate highway,16 3 donating to public
television1 4 or a blood bank,16 5 voting, 6 or increasing one's efforts
to adjust for what would otherwise be excessive payment, 6 " the
strong implication is that individuals, for whatever reason, seem to
free-ride in far fewer instances than there are opportunities availa-
ble. The implication is that even members of advantage-taking
classes have the capacity to act altruistically and define their inter-
ests more broadly than those that are narrowly self-serving. 68 It is
even possible that this willingness not to always take advantage of
the weakness of others is a trait that can be reinforced.
In its full-blown version, the possibility exists that individuals
take advantage of their power vis-A-vis others as a defensive strat-
egy because the assumption is that others are likely to be acting
with the same selfish motives. If so, one could view a sense of com-
pensatory justice requiring roughly equal exchanges as a type of
public good-something that individuals desire but that few will
act on, because unless everyone acts similarly, the objective cannot
be met. 6 '
163. See Robert H. Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function,
Would He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 593, 593 (1987).
164. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND MORALrrY 12 (1982).
165. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1971) (studying the scientific,
social, economic, and ethical implications of the procurement, processing, and distribution
of human blood).
166. On the rationality of voting from the standpoint of individual self-interest, see
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMICS THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (approaching the problem of
democratic government from an economic standpoint); MARGOLIS, supra note 164, at 92-95;
Stephen G. Salkever, Who Knows Whether It's Rational to Vote?, 90 ETHICS 203 (1980)
(arguing that voting cannot be explained by either an economic (cost-benefit) analysis or a
political (duty-bound) analysis, but can only be explained on a situational, case-by-case
basis).
167. See Adams, supra note 18, at 284-85.
168. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1338-51 (arguing that a person who makes a donation
with the hope of receiving something has not performed an altruistic act).
169. This, of course, raises the familiar problem of the "prisoner's dilemma." See gener-
ally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (utilizing a computer study of
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Aside from these possibly fanciful hopes about human nature,
there is substantial support for the belief that law can have the
sort of preference-shaping effect that I am discussing. For example,
in a recent article, Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmdt170 makes the
crucial distinction, primarily in the context of criminal law, be-
tween "(1) shaping the individual's opportunities to give incentive
for desired behavior, or (2) shaping the individual's preferences by
increasing her taste for desired behavior."171 From the perspective
of mental health law, Professors David Wexler and Bruce Winick
have done path-breaking work dealing with "therapeutic jurispru-
dence. '17 2 By therapeutic jurisprudence, they mean "the extent to
which substantive rules, legal procedures, and the roles of lawyers
and judges produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic conse-
quences." 3 More directly, to what extent can law have a healing
effect? 174
It may seem odd to draw on scholarship from criminal law and
mental health law in an argument for expanded use of unconscion-
ability, but the matters discussed in this Article skirt the edges of
both these fields. "Unconscionability" has a distinctly moral con-
notation.175 Furthermore, by suggesting that routine reliance on
unconscionability may reshape the preferences of both the ad-
the prisoner's dilemma as the point of departure for a discussion of the problem of coopera-
tion given an underlying pursuit of self-interest); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS 88-113 (1957) (providing a discussion of two-person, non-zero-sum,
non-cooperative games such as the prisoner's dilemma).
170. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 10.
171. Id. at 1. See generally John R. McKean & Robert R. Keller, The Shaping of Tastes,
Pareto Efficiency and Economic Policy, 12 J. BEHAV. ECON. 23 (1983) (analyzing the treat-
ment of tastes and attempts to incorporate tastes and preferences into welfare theory); Carl
C. von Weizsicker, Notes on Endogenous Change of Tastes, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 345 (1971)
(arguing that the variables about which economists are usually concerned are not flexible
enough to cope with endogenously changing tastes).
172. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 16.
173. Id. at ix.
174. See id. at 8 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), to illustrate implicit Su-
preme Court recognition of "therapeutic jurisprudence").
175. Even Professor Leff, who found little clarity in § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which addresses unconscionability, noted that, "[i]f reading [§ 2-302] makes any-
thing clear it is that reading [the] section alone makes nothing clear about 'unconscio-
nability' except perhaps that it is pejorative." Leff, supra note 140, at 487 (citation
omitted).
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vantaged and disadvantaged, I am arguing that law can be used to
repair some of the psychic harm caused by rigid class stratification.
In a transaction that a court determines to be unconscionable,
especially if the identity of the unconscionable party is publicized,
the unconscionable party is likely to feel shame and "a negative,
downward change in self-concept"'176 is likely to be triggered.
Perhaps more important are the affirming and educative effects on
the person who has not acted unconscionably 177 According to
Professors Wexler and Winick, "the intensity and durability of a
stigmatizing label can have major consequences for the labeled
person.' 1 78 But they also note the importance of studying the reac-
tion of "others" to the labeling.179 It is important to note that the
affirming effects on individuals are quite different from finding
that they were indeed victimized by the advantage-taker. The
sense, especially in a transactional setting, is that one party
"played by the rules," while the other party did not. This affirma-
tion can have the generalized impact of affirming the total person
and his personal sense of self-worth. Moreover, as far as the disad-
vantaged are concerned, to the extent that their diminished sense
of entitlement is a function of low self-esteem' 0 and personality
plasticity,' the effect is in a very real sense a therapeutic or heal-
ing one. Here the wounds are what Sennett and Cobb, in their
seminal work, call the "hidden injuries of class."'182
My proposals, especially for those who think in traditional eco-
nomic ways, are not without some risk. There are two risks to con-
176. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1886 (1991).
177. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 8 (1987) (stating that the act
of denouncing crime serves several important societal functions, including expression of an-
ger and stigmatization of the offender); see also Johs Andenaes, General Preven-
tion-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176, 179-80 (1952) (sug-
gesting that a concrete expression of society's disapproval of an act creates conscious and
unconscious inhibitions within the public against committing the act).
178. WEXLER & WINICK, supra not 16, at 306.
179. Id., cf. Laurence R. lannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in
Cults, of Communes, and Other Collectives, 100 J. POL. ECON. 271, 289-90 (1992) (discussing
the use of nonproductive costs, such as painful initiation rites, to weed out potential free-
riders in collective communities).
180. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
182. SENNETT & COBB, supra note 8.
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sider. First, broader application of substantive unconscionability
may dampen the incentives to improve for those who have made
what turn out to be unfavorable exchanges. Second, the routine
use of unconscionability is comparable to the use of price ceilings
and may affect the poor disproportionately 183 In both cases, al-
lowing individuals to escape lopsided bargains ultimately can make
them worse off. To some extent, my points about the use of uncon-
scionability as a preference-shaping tool can be illustrated by con-
trasting that view with the conventional economic objections to the
use of unconscionability
The first argument is that only by forcing those who are disad-
vantaged to live with their bargains can we provide them with the
motivation to read the small print, to become better educated, and
to assert themselves.""' If one subscribes to this argument, then he
or she disagrees with the core elements of this Article. A person
taking this view would have to believe that finding against those
who have been disadvantaged actually has a motivating and up-
lifting effect. The counterargument, as suggested in the previous
section, is that law teaches people about their value and what is
regarded by society as just, and that people adapt their own beliefs
to these teachings.18 Thus, the real impact of decisions that refuse
to respond to advantage-taking is to make advantage-taking seem
more legitimate to all affected. Empirical evidence strongly sug-
183. See Epstein, supra note 100, at 305-15 (arguing that when substantive unconsciona-
bility is used it has the effect of undercutting the private contract which ends up causing
more social harm than good); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1057-63 (stating the proposition
that when a contract provision that might be considered oppressive, such as a warranty
disclaimer, is invalidated by the court, this produces an undesirable result because the poor
may not be able to afford the required warranty).
184. One could view the matter as a unilateral mistake. In these instances, the general
rule is that one is not excused from the contract unless enforcement would be unconsciona-
ble or the other party had reason to know of the mistake. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 153 (1979). The basic law and economics view on unilateral mistake, as I under-
stand it, is that excusing parties too frequently when they have made a "mistake" may
reduce incentives to produce or acquire information. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.6 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that rules requiring disclosure of information
are inefficient and result in lessened incentives to acquire and use information). In the con-
text of this Article, the argument would be that routine application of unconscionability
would reduce the incentive to read small print and search for better terms. I am indebted to
Dan Yeager for making the suggestion that this is an argument against the position I have
taken in this Article.
185. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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gests that this would be especially true of the lower class and
higher plasticity individuals.1 6
For example, contrast a very narrow standard under which all
bargains are enforced, no matter how uneven the division of the
surplus, with a policy that routinely refuses to enforce bargains in-
volving undue advantage-taking. Certainly the second policy would
be more likely to teach both parties that they are of equal moral
worth and that the law does not countenance advantage-taking. As
the advantage-takers are delegitimized, the self-esteem and asser-
tiveness of the less advantaged seems likely to grow. As it grows,
they are less in need of judicial intervention.
The second line of argument, based on unconscionability as the
imposition of price ceilings, fits nicely into the Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co.i8 7 fact pattern, but can be applied more
generally Those making the price ceiling argument foresee alter-
nate scenarios. The first scenario is that the merchants are making
money hand-over-fist and that this is good, because competing
merchants will soon see the opportunities for profits by operating
in that market and will enter the market, thereby forcing prices
down.
The price ceiling will retard this entry This scenario has a num-
ber of responses. First, it requires one to have tremendous faith in
the market and believe that the firm will not engage in conduct
that would delay or prevent entry of competitors.' In addition,
one has to ignore the fact that monopolies, when faced with price
ceilings, may find it profitable to increase output. Putting this pos-
sibility aside, is it necessary for some buyers to pay supracompeti-
tive prices in order that others will have lower prices in the future?
If an expansive definition of unconscionability is a form of price
regulation and constitutes the setting of a price ceiling, then
shortages will result, translating into long lines of consumers at the
stores forced to charge prices that permit only a normal profit. Ac-
cording to economic theory, as long as new entrants can be assured
of at least earning a normal profit, they will enter the market. In
186. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
187. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See supra note 100 (providing a description of this
case).
188. Efforts to preserve monopoly power have been identified as one of the social costs of
monopoly. POSNER, supra note 184, at 279-80.
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essence, waiting in line would provide the rationing that higher
prices would provide under the typical regime. The point is. that
limiting the prices will not mean that there will not be new en-
trants and increases in sales.
In the second scenario the merchants in the high crime, high in-
surance rate, high credit risk neighborhoods are barely making a
profit. If they are not permitted to charge prices for appliances
that are greatly in excess of those charged at suburban discount
stores or cannot routinely use add-on clauses on credit sales, they
will be unable to operate and earn a normal profit. 8 ' Eventually,
they will leave the neighborhood and reduce the choices available
to the consumers in the area. There are two responses to this sce-
nario. The first is to ask whether the risks of default and even the
risks of crime in the neighborhood are not themselves responses to
the high prices and onerous credit terms of the sellers. Certainly,
the lower one's payments the more likely he or she is to make
them. And the type of resentment that can build when prices are
high and the buyers have no choice can lead to frustration that
results in a violent reaction. The point is that the impact of "price
ceilings" on the risks faced by merchants is at least an empirical
question.
The second, and more important, response requires one to recall
that the willingness to pay the prices offered or accept certain
credit terms can be a function of the buyers' sense of entitlement.
If this is true, and it is true that that sense of entitlement is
shaped by the law's persistence in enforcing these exchanges and
its general tendency to reinforce class distinctions, is there really
any harm if the law shifts and the store does leave the
neighborhood? 190
To see this in a different light, suppose a series of judicial opin-
ions finding several bargains unconscionable forced merchants to
adopt new policies that meant that they could not operate profita-
bly in the neighborhood. Suppose further that the people who
shopped at the stores understood that the prices and credit terms
189. A "normal" profit would be a return to investors sufficient to justify continued in-
vestment in the enterprise.
190. Admittedly, there will be short-run harm if consumers are denied access to necessi-
ties that are unavailable elsewhere. Presumably, prices that reflect the costs of supplying
necessities would not be routinely regarded as unconscionable.
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were regarded as exploitative and unenforceable. Critics of the ex-
pansion of unconscionability would suggest, because the customers
are now denied a choice that once existed, that the stores' custom-
ers would be up in arms.' 9 ' The reasoning, in economic terms,
would be that there were Pareto superior moves available to both
buyers and sellers and the unconscionability rulings have now re-
moved those opportunities. The problem with this argument is
that it assumes that the preferences of the buyers with respect to
their sense of compensatory justice is independent of the repeated
findings that the prior exchanges were unconscionable.
Once the information is available that the merchants' departure
was a result of what the public generally regarded as unfair deal-
ings, it seems quite unlikely that the former customers would expe-
rience a sense of loss. In effect, the law would inform them that
they deserved better and that their preferences with respect to the
terms of exchanges would reflect that knowledge. Please note that
the argument is not that the broader use of unconscionability has
made people better off, 192 but rather that whether they would feel
worse off when these opportunities are eliminated is, at least, an
empirical question. If they do not, it is foolish to say the use of
unconscionability has actually made them worse off.
One final note may be in order on this last point. Some may say
that the sort of "engineering" that I am proposing in order to con-
vince the buyers that they really did not want those lopsided bar-
gains in the first place, is unacceptable interference with their au-
tonomy This may be true. On the other hand, it is important to
recall that their initial acceptance of bargains that would violate
the sense of compensatory justice of those from higher classes is no
less a product of "engineering." Consequently, the autonomy exer-
cised in accepting those bargains cannot be defended as more legit-
imate or as a more accurate indicator of their true preferences.
191. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1057-63 (providing an example of this type of
thinking).
192. I do believe, however, that the long-term effects will be to improve the position of
those who are worse off because they will value themselves more and will bring this valua-
tion to their private orderings.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to explore the mechanism
through which inequality and class stratification are perpetuated.
At one level, the stratification continues because individuals in
their private orderings permit it to continue. Those who have less
tend to agree to continue to take less. At this simplistic level, how-
ever, terms like "agree" and "consent" have only the thinnest of
meanings.
Individuals who "consent" to uneven bargains are responding to
a system in which they have been taught that they deserve less
than others. Whether it is in the way the privileged have defined
which inputs count in determining the rewards to which individu-
als are entitled or the tendency for individuals to assess their well-
being by comparing themselves to those who are similarly de-
prived, those from the lower class sense that they have been
treated justly even when they receive unequal treatment. They
tend to blame themselves for their plight and they are easily con-
vinced that it is a consequence of personal shortcomings instead of
systemic bias.
The fact that individuals have adjusted their sense of compensa-
tory justice so that it reflects the needs of class preservation raises
two issues. First, if the terms, and to some extent the existence, of
interclass contracts are contingent on class-based differences, is
Pareto superiority a morally sound basis for enforcing contracts?
Here the argument is made that, if lopsided exchanges only seem
acceptable because individuals are accustomed to being deprived,
there seems little moral basis for holding them to their contracts.
The second issue is whether contract law can be adapted as a
preference-shaping and therapeutic tool in order to heal the "hid-
den injuries of class" that account for the apparent willingness of
the disadvantaged to play their role in the cycle of exploitation. I
have suggested that fuller development of substantive unconscion-
ability with public notice of when parties have acted unconscion-
ably may serve this end. The goal would be to educate and vindi-
cate those who are traditionally disadvantaged so that they may
adjust their sense of entitlement. Such an approach seems prefera-
ble to efforts to help those who are deprived in ways that only
make them more dependent.
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